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DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION†
STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN*

ABSTRACT
In the United States, enforcement of laws prohibiting workplace
discrimination rests almost entirely on the shoulders of employee victims, who
must first file charges with a government agency and then pursue litigation
themselves. While the law forbids retaliation against employees who complain,
this does little to prevent it, in part because employees are also responsible for
initiating any claims of retaliation they experience as a result of their original
discrimination claims. The burden on employees to complain—and their
justified fear of retaliation if they do so—results in underenforcement of the law
and a failure to spot and redress underlying structural causes of race and sex
discrimination at work. By statutory design, government enforcement agencies
play a crucial but limited role in litigating discrimination lawsuits, which makes
significant expansion of the agencies’ roles politically infeasible.
This Article considers compelled disclosure of employer information as a
means of better enforcing antidiscrimination law. Information-forcing
mechanisms have long been a part of securities law. The recent #MeToo and
Time’s Up social movements have brought the power of public exposure to the
issues of sexual harassment and pay discrimination at work. Drawing on lessons
from both contexts, this Article argues for imposing affirmative public disclosure
requirements on employers that track the pay, promotion, and harassment of
employees by their sex and race. It documents emerging disclosure models in
some state and international laws meant to target workplace discrimination and
highlights where existing U.S. federal law opens the door to such an approach.
It also considers counterarguments raised by compelled disclosure, including
privacy and free speech concerns. Requiring public disclosures on equality
measures is an incremental yet important untapped mechanism that can shift
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some of the enforcement burden for U.S. antidiscrimination law off of employees
and onto employers and responsible government agencies.

2021]

DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION

289

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 290
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES............................................... 294
A. The Process for Enforcing U.S. Antidiscrimination Law ............ 295
B. Retaliation Protections ................................................................ 297
C. Enforcement Gaps and Diminishing Access to Courts ................ 299
II. THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE AS A MEANS OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW ENFORCEMENT ........................................ 300
A. The Lessons of Disclosure from Securities Law .......................... 300
1. Correcting Information Asymmetry ...................................... 303
2. Behavior-Forcing Effects ...................................................... 305
3. “Publicness” Effects .............................................................. 306
B. The Lessons of Exposure from #MeToo and Time’s Up .............. 308
C. A Role for Disclosures in Antidiscrimination Law ...................... 310
1. Retaliation Protections Are Not Enough:
From Ex-Post to Ex-Ante Action .......................................... 311
2. Information Forcing in a Time of Secrecy:
From Transparency to Accountability ................................... 311
3. Enforcement Role of the State:
From Gatekeeper to Enforcer ................................................ 312
III. MODELS FOR FORCING DISCLOSURE OF DISCRIMINATION .................. 313
A. Pay Data to Close Gender and Racial Pay Gaps ........................ 314
1. Current Comparative Examples............................................. 315
2. Requiring Pay-Data Disclosures in U.S. Law ....................... 322
B. Promotion Data to Break Through Glass Ceilings ..................... 330
1. Current Comparative Examples............................................. 332
2. Requiring Diversity-of-Leadership Disclosures in
U.S. Law ............................................................................... 335
C. Harassment Settlements to Expose and Change Cultures ........... 336
1. Current Comparative Examples............................................. 337
2. Requiring Harassment-Settlement Disclosures in
U.S. Law ............................................................................... 340
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS....... 348
A. The Case Against Disclosing Discrimination .............................. 348
1. Cost/Benefit Concerns and Disclosure Overload .................. 349
2. Manipulability and Symbolic Compliance ............................ 351
3. Rebound Effects .................................................................... 352
B. Privacy Concerns ........................................................................ 353
C. First Amendment Concerns ......................................................... 355
CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 357

290

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:287

INTRODUCTION
In the United States, if you experience discrimination or harassment at work
based on your sex, race, or other protected characteristic, you—the victim of
discrimination—are responsible for enforcing the law that ensures your right to
be free from it.1 If you complain of discrimination and your employer responds
by taking further adverse action against you, you are then responsible for
enforcing the law that ensures your right to be free from retaliation after
complaining of discrimination.2 The burden of enforcing U.S. antidiscrimination
law thus rests nearly entirely on the shoulders of employee victims.
When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”
or the “Act”)—the main federal law that prohibits employment discrimination,
including harassment, on the basis of race, sex, and other protected
characteristics—it created a federal enforcement agency to oversee the law, the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).3 But Congress
also created a private right of action for employees, anticipating that the bulk of
enforcement would be left to private actors.4 The EEOC works actively to
interpret the law, educate employers, and assist the tens of thousands of
employees who contact it each year to report discrimination.5 Its crucially
important administrative and interpretive efforts should not be understated. Yet
the agency has limited size and limited resources, much of which go to its
gatekeeping function of granting employees who have filed charges the right to
find their own lawyers and sue their employers in private lawsuits.6
The EEOC does not monitor employer behavior or conduct inspections or
investigations of its own accord. Aside from a small group of attorneys tasked
with developing class or “systemic” cases in certain industries known to be the

1

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-5; infra Section

I.A.
Id. § 2000e-3, e-5; see also infra Section I.A.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 25859 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4).
4 Id. § 706(f).
5 See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2019, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/7WJUWVUB] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Charge Statistics]; Overview, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/overview [https://perma.cc/TN5T-VJ84] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
6 What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees
/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/4MYL-QKLC] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020). See generally
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008) (cataloguing reasons that the extant private Title VII
litigation regime fails employees who face workplace discrimination); David Freeman
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (critiquing EEOC’s
current function as gatekeeper and proposing how it can reform this function to improve the
Title VII litigation regime).
2
3
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worst offenders,7 the EEOC learns about employers that are violating the law
only from employees who come forward to report themselves as victims of
discrimination or harassment, and even then it very rarely intervenes.8 Indeed,
of the roughly 75,000 to 100,000 charges of discrimination and harassment it
received in each of the past twenty years, the EEOC itself litigated only between
114 and 465 cases each year—or fewer than 0.5%.9
To those familiar with Title VII law and its enforcement mechanisms, it came
as no surprise, then, when the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements began to
expose pervasive sexual harassment, sexual assault, and pay discrimination
throughout U.S. workplaces that had gone unreported and unaddressed for
decades.10 The EEOC’s own reports cite studies estimating that at least one in
four women (and possibly as many as 85% of women) experience sexual
harassment at work; 75% of harassment goes unreported; and, of those who do
complain about their harassment, 75% then experience retaliation.11 For some
employers, a commitment to racial and gender equality leads to voluntary
measures to prevent discrimination; for others, the fear of lawsuits provides the
necessary motivation. But recent social movements have exposed the deep
imperfections of a system that relies on voluntary compliance under threat of
liability.
Worse still, a decade of precedent under Chief Justice Roberts’s Supreme
Court has made it more difficult for those employees who are willing to come
forward with claims of harassment or discrimination to pursue private

7 See Systemic Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/systemic-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/3M5Q-XA76] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
8 EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2019, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/82L9-Z5GP] (last visited Dec.
28, 2020) [hereinafter Litigation Statistics].
9 See infra Section I.A. Compare Charge Statistics, supra note 5, with Litigation Statistics,
supra note 8.
10 #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2020, 1:52 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/U3LJ-Y3WD]; see also Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders
Explain the Difference Between the 2 Movements — and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22,
2018, 5:21 PM), https://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-andtimes-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/JWX2-47WH].
11 CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8-9, 15-16 (2016) [hereinafter FELDBLUM &
LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE], https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files
/migrated_files/eeoc/task_force /harassment/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JE8-VLQD]; see
also Tara Golshan, Study Finds 75 Percent of Workplace Harassment Victims Experienced
Retaliation When They Spoke Up, VOX (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com
/identities/2017/10/15/16438750/weinstein-sexual-harassment-facts [https://perma.cc/H8FZ2CLX].
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enforcement lawsuits when they do so.12 Court decisions on civil pleading
standards have raised the bar for what a plaintiff must allege in their original
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss,13 made it harder for plaintiffs to get a
class action certified,14 and upheld mandatory predispute arbitration agreements
that force cases out of court entirely.15
This Article argues that the failure of U.S. law to adequately prevent and
redress workplace discrimination and harassment is due, in large part, to an
enforcement mechanism that is woefully out of balance, placing virtually all
enforcement responsibility on employee victims. At the same time, it
acknowledges that a dramatic shift toward greater public enforcement through
increased agency-initiated investigation and litigation is politically unrealistic
and financially infeasible. Instead, this Article proposes placing greater
affirmative compliance responsibility on employers to show that they are taking
active efforts to prevent harassment and discrimination in their own ranks. These
employer efforts would be accompanied by a much smaller and less costly
increase in public enforcement efforts: a governmental responsibility to collect,
monitor, and publicly distribute compliance information produced by employers
themselves.
To develop such a proposal, this Article draws upon lessons from two distinct
contexts: securities law and feminist social movements. First, securities law
offers lessons on the utility of legal disclosure regimes, as well as their
limitations. Though designed to serve a different purpose, securities laws
provide one example of information forcing through requiring some businesses
to publicly report data to government regulators. Second, the #MeToo and
Time’s Up movements offer lessons on the power of publicly exposing
harassment and discrimination as a means to influence behavior. Both securities
law and feminist social movements provide the background upon which to
consider the role that disclosure requirements can play in improving
enforcement of antidiscrimination law.

See Stephanie Bornstein, Rights in Recession: Toward Administrative
Antidiscrimination Law, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 141-53 (2014).
13 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007) (replacing notice pleading
standard with plausibility standard to determine whether plaintiff stated a claim to relief);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (extending plausibility standard announced in
Twombly to all civil actions in federal court); see also Bornstein, supra note 12, at 142-46.
14 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-52 (2011) (interpreting the
“commonality” requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
to require not just common questions of law or fact but also common answers to those
questions); see also Bornstein, supra note 12, at 151-53.
15 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (holding that
employees may be forced to waive their right to class relief, despite the National Labor
Relations Act’s right to “concerted activities”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570
U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (rejecting the “effective vindication” doctrine); see also Bornstein,
supra note 12, at 148-51.
12
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Grounded in these contexts, this Article argues for imposing affirmative
disclosure requirements on larger employers in the areas of unequal pay by sex
and race, lack of promotion of women and racial minorities, and sexual and
racial harassment—referred to here as “equality disclosures.” Few legal scholars
have considered the role of mandatory disclosures in the context of employment
law.16 While several scholars have explored the value of pay transparency as a
means for increasing employee negotiating power in the arena of private law,17
this Article instead argues in favor of regulation requiring reporting to
government enforcement agencies as a way of unleashing the additional power
of public law.18 And while a handful of scholars have explored adding
information on equality measures to existing securities law disclosure
requirements governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),19
this Article instead proposes adding a new disclosure regime to
antidiscrimination law governed by the regulatory authority of the EEOC,
arguing that the EEOC is better suited to collect this information and use it to
enhance antidiscrimination law enforcement.20

16 The notable exception is Cynthia Estlund. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The
Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 357, 365-66 (2011) [hereinafter
Estlund, Just the Facts] (making a broad theoretical case for mandatory disclosure to
“improv[e] the efficiency of employment contracts and labor markets,” encourage
“compliance
with
existing
substantive
mandates,”
and
“induc[e]
employers . . . toward . . . good employment practices and standards of social responsibility,”
and proposing disclosures on work hours, job safety, job security, work-life balance, waiver
of legal rights, and workforce demographics); Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for
Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781 (2014)
[hereinafter Estlund, Extending the Case] (applying her general theory to pay disclosures);
see also ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 35-49 (2007); RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN,
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 132-79 (1976); Charlotte S. Alexander, Transparency and
Transmission: Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses to
Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 179-205 (2015).
17 See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 1001-15 (2011); Estlund, Extending
the Case, supra note 16, at 783; Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows
and the Future of Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 567-87 (2020); Gowri Ramachandran,
Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1059-62 (2012). For a discussion of
transparency around workforce diversity initiatives, see Jamillah Bowman Williams,
Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1723-30 (2019).
18 See infra Section II.C.2.
19 See, e.g., NADER, GREEN & SELIGMAN, supra note 16; Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund,
Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018); Elizabeth A.
Aronson, Note, The First Amendment and Regulatory Responses to Workplace Sexual
Misconduct: Clarifying the Treatment of Compelled Disclosure Regimes, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1201 (2018).
20 See infra Section III.C.2.
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This Article looks to examples from antidiscrimination reporting
requirements recently enacted in other high-income21 countries and several U.S.
states and then builds upon the limited data already collected in some areas of
federal antidiscrimination law. Part I describes the current system of civil
enforcement for discrimination and harassment claims under U.S. law and any
retaliation that results from the original complaints. It identifies the severe gaps
that currently exist in this system and highlights the impending crisis in access
to private enforcement due to recent Supreme Court procedural jurisprudence.
Part II provides the justification for imposing affirmative reporting requirements
on employers as a means of antidiscrimination law enforcement. It draws lessons
on information forcing from disclosure requirements in the securities-law
context and lessons on the power of public exposure from the #MeToo and
Time’s Up movements. This Part then explains the role that disclosure
requirements can play in antidiscrimination law, helping shift from reactive to
proactive efforts, from secrecy to accountability, and from gatekeeping to more
robust enforcing. Part III turns to specific mechanisms for forcing disclosure by
employers, looking to legal models in European and other high-income countries
and models recently enacted in several U.S. states. It then builds upon the limited
data collection efforts already in place in other areas of federal
antidiscrimination law to provide a path forward. Part IV concludes by
considering counterarguments against disclosure requirements, including
questions about their effectiveness, privacy concerns, and potential First
Amendment implications as compelled speech.
Ultimately, this Article argues that imposing affirmative public reporting
requirements on employers around equality measures is a justifiable,
incremental, and necessary step to shift the burden of antidiscrimination law
enforcement off of employee victims alone and more equally onto responsible
institutions to reach persistent problems of workplace inequality.
I.

THE LIMITATIONS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES

This Part explains the current process for enforcing U.S. antidiscrimination
law, including protections against retaliation for reporting violations. Because
enforcement relies nearly entirely on private lawsuits brought by employees who
fear retaliation if they complain, only a fraction of discrimination and
harassment claims are ever pursued, leaving significant gaps in enforcement. For
those who are willing to complain, the past decade and a half of Supreme Court
procedural jurisprudence has made it more difficult to pursue private lawsuits,

21

The term “high-income countries” comes from World Bank classifications defining
“high-income economies [as] those with a [gross national income] per capita of $12,536 or
more.” World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK: DATA,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 [https://perma.cc/66HZZAZE] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
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exacerbating the problem of underenforcement. As this Part documents, the
burden of enforcing Title VII falls disproportionately on discrimination victims
themselves—those with the least power and resources to prevent and redress
discrimination.
A.

The Process for Enforcing U.S. Antidiscrimination Law

Under federal antidiscrimination law and its state law equivalents, employees
are primarily responsible for recognizing, reporting, and pursuing discrimination
and harassment complaints. By congressional design, Title VII has a hybrid
enforcement system in which the statute is enforced by both a public agency, the
federal EEOC, and by private plaintiffs, who may pursue their own private rights
of action.22 Yet the burden of this hybrid system is not equally shared; the EEOC
plays a vitally important but very limited role in enforcement litigation.23 And
virtually no enforcement can happen without an employee who is willing to
speak up and file a complaint against their employer.24
On the public side of the hybrid enforcement system, the EEOC has a small
unit of systemic litigators that seek out, develop, and pursue law-reform
litigation.25 They devote their limited resources to a small proportion of cases
that need them the most: those that set new precedent, affect significant
employers, or target particular industries in which workers are unlikely to be
able to find private representation.26 In extremely rare circumstances, the EEOC
may choose to intervene and agree to represent an employee based on a filed
charge.27 Yet the primary role of EEOC enforcement is to pursue those cases
that the agency itself deems a priority and develops.28 The cases the EEOC does
choose to pursue are often designed for maximum impact with limited resources
by creating visible examples of advancement in the law or seeking results against
the largest employers.29 But while their impact may be important, the miniscule
number of enforcement actions pursued by the EEOC30 leaves most employees
on their own to pursue their claims through private litigation.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -5.
See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 126-41.
24 Filing a Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees
/charge.cfm [https://perma.cc/S3J2-RLRY] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); Filing a Lawsuit,
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/2B9T-F7N5] (last
visited Dec. 28, 2020).
25 See Systemic Discrimination, supra note 7.
26 Litigation
Procedures,
EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/litigation-procedures
[https://perma.cc/Y2HR-GUUJ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
27 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 130 (illustrating “small number of cases” where EEOC
initiates litigation “from a plaintiff’s charges filed with the agency”).
28 See id. (explaining that EEOC litigation also results from “agency’s own investigation
and enforcement priorities”).
29 See Litigation Procedures, supra note 26.
30 See Litigation Statistics, supra note 8.
22
23
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Comparing the number of antidiscrimination lawsuits pursued by the EEOC
to the number pursued privately paints a stark picture. In each one of the last
twenty-two years, the EEOC has received between 72,675 and 99,947 charges
of discrimination on the basis of sex, race, or another protected class.31 In each
one of those years, the EEOC filed only between 114 and 465 lawsuits—
meaning they represented between 0.1% and 0.6% of all charge filers.32 The
agency resolved another 5% to 15% of charges each year through settlements or
conciliation.33 That leaves the remainder of the enforcement—for at least 85%
and up to 95% of all charge filers to the EEOC—to the filers’ own devices to
obtain private representation. Indeed, in the past decade, private attorneys filed
between 13,000 and 22,000 employment discrimination lawsuits in federal
courts annually—roughly forty to sixty-five times as many cases as the EEOC;34
likely thousands more were filed in state courts.
Moreover, every single charge filed began with an employee who was willing
and able to file a complaint. An employee must first understand that what
happened to them at work constituted protected-class discrimination or
harassment—a challenge given that a mere 10.3% of the U.S. workforce (and
only 6.2% of the private-sector workforce) is represented by a union that might
provide legal information.35 The employee must then decide that they are willing
to take the risk of complaining, despite fear of retaliation or potential costs to
their personal and professional lives.36 If so, they must figure out how to file a
charge of discrimination or harassment with the federal EEOC or state
equivalent within either 180 or 300 days from the adverse employment action.37
In the vast majority of cases, after an agency investigation, the EEOC will issue
the employee a “right to sue letter,” which gives the employee the right to find
a private plaintiff’s attorney willing to take their case on a contingency fee or

Charge Statistics, supra note 5.
Litigation Statistics, supra note 8.
33 All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2019, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm [https://perma.cc/4BAM-DK6J]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
34 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 130.
35 Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union Members — 2019, at 5 tbl.1, 7 tbl.3 (Jan. 22,
2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RFH-MK3T].
36 See infra Section I.B.
37 At the state level, the enforcement mechanisms largely mirror those of the federal law.
All but three states—Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi—have their own state fairemployment-practice agencies that accept complaints and conduct investigations. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.74 (2020) (listing state and local fair-employment-practice agencies); see also Fair
Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/fairemployment-practices-agencies-fepas-and-dual-filing [https://perma.cc/2Q9Y-TNNA] (last
visited Dec. 28, 2020); Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/timelimits-filing-charge [https://perma.cc/55QC-UE6C] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
31
32
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for the prospect of attorneys’ fees, despite the low success rate of plaintiffs in
employment discrimination lawsuits.38
There is no doubt, then, that the EEOC and state agencies play a critically
important role in issuing regulations and pursuing the hundreds of systemic or
law-reform cases they pursue each year. Yet without employees’ willingness to
publicly pursue actions against their employers, private businesses are rarely, if
ever, held accountable for any discrimination or harassment that occurs in their
midst.
Retaliation Protections

B.

To encourage employees to pursue discrimination and harassment
complaints, Title VII prohibits retaliation against any employee for complaining
or participating in another employee’s complaint.39 Yet this does not stop
retaliation from occurring, further undermining the strength of existing
antidiscrimination law enforcement.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful to take an adverse action against an employee
“because he has opposed any practice” unlawful under the Act or “made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing” under the Act.40 The Supreme Court has interpreted
protections against retaliation more broadly than those against discrimination to
encourage employees to help enforce Title VII.41 The Court held that, while
discrimination is only actionable where it results in an “adverse employment
action” at work—for example, a denial of promotion or something that impacts
pay—retaliation is actionable when it results in any “materially adverse” action
that would “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.”42 This may include actions taken outside of work43 or actions
taken against a very close third party (like the original complainant’s fiancé)
meant to punish the complainant.44 Yet the Court has also placed limitations on
this breadth, holding that retaliation must be the but-for cause of the materially
adverse action45 and limiting the reach of protections to require a “reasonable,
good faith belief” that the underlying action violated the law when the employee
complains internally (rather than to a state or federal agency).46

See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, supra note 6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
40 Id.
41 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
42 Id. at 57.
43 Id. at 57, 64.
44 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 175 (2011).
45 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2013).
46 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam) (quoting
Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (9th Cir. July 19,
2000)).
38
39
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The fact that retaliation is also prohibited under Title VII has not stopped
employers from retaliating. Indeed, over the past two decades, the number of
retaliation charges filed with the EEOC has steadily increased nearly every
year.47 In 1997, a claim of retaliation was filed in 22% of charges filed with the
EEOC; by 2019, that number had more than doubled to 53.8%, meaning that
more than half of those who filed a discrimination or harassment charge in 2019
also experienced retaliation for doing so.48 Of course, the cause of the increase
in retaliation charges is not clear; it could either be due to an increase in the
incidence of retaliation or in the knowledge of the issue and the ability to add it
to one’s underlying discrimination charge. Regardless, it is safe to say that
retaliation is not occurring less often than in the past, despite increased
awareness of the problem.
Legal scholars attribute the persistence of retaliation despite its legal
proscription to a number of causes. As Deborah Brake has noted, retaliation is
so difficult to root out because it “performs important work in institutions,”
helping to “suppress challenges to perceived inequality.”49 Employees engage
in a cost-benefit analysis before complaining of discrimination and often
perceive reporting “to entail high costs,” including “[f]ear of provoking
retaliation.”50 As Nicole Porter has explained, the seemingly broad standards
created by the Supreme Court are actually more difficult to meet than they
seem.51 In particular, Sandra Sperino has documented how lower courts have
applied precedent narrowly, excluding many consequences that employees fear
(for example, reprimands, schedule or assignment changes, or ostracism) from
the definition of “materially adverse” action required to trigger antiretaliation
protections.52
In the end, enforcement of Title VII’s antiretaliation protections suffers from
the same limitations as enforcement of its discrimination and harassment
protections. Any retaliation that occurs after a complaint of discrimination can
only be redressed in the same way as the underlying discrimination—by an
employee willing to file a charge with the EEOC and, almost always, able to
find a plaintiff’s attorney to represent them in a private lawsuit.53 Given that now
more than half of those willing to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC

Charge Statistics, supra note 5.
Id.
49 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 36, 37-39 (2005).
50 Id. at 37.
51 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 49, 54-55 (2018); see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89
IND. L.J. 115, 135-64 (2014).
52 Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 204142 (2015); see also Porter, supra note 51, at 55, 57.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
47
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also experience retaliation, employees’ fears that they will be penalized for
complaining are not just warranted but are, in fact, rational.
Enforcement Gaps and Diminishing Access to Courts

C.

Under the existing hybrid enforcement system for Title VII, private plaintiffs’
lawsuits account for the vast majority of enforcement actions, and justifiable fear
of retaliation impedes employees from complaining. This reality leads to two
troubling implications. First, there is a significant gap between the prevalence of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in the workplace and the frequency
with which they are reported and successfully redressed. For example, studies
estimate that between 25% and 85% of women are sexually harassed at work,54
and approximately 70% of those who experience harassment do not report it.55
This is not surprising given that 75% of those who do complain report then
experiencing retaliation for their complaint.56
Second, to the extent that Title VII relies on private litigation for enforcement,
any deterrent effects are now hampered by a jurisprudential trend toward
limiting private access to the courts. While private litigation was a cornerstone
of Title VII enforcement for the first four decades after its enactment in 1964,
“litigation reform” efforts and procedural decisions in the past two decades pose
a threat to its efficacy. Since the early 2000s, and particularly under Chief Justice
Roberts’s Supreme Court, a series of decisions on arbitration agreements and
class actions stands to limit enforcement goals.57 A full analysis of the vast body
of scholarship documenting this trend is outside the scope of this Article,58 but
two developments bear mentioning.
On class actions, Supreme Court precedent reining in class certification,
including the 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,59 has made it
harder and more costly for plaintiff’s attorneys to pursue class actions on behalf
of victims of discrimination.60 This means that employees—particularly those
who earn lower wages—are less likely to be able to find representation. On
arbitration agreements, a series of cases upheld the enforceability of mandatory
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 8.
Id. at 15-16; see also Golshan, supra note 11.
56 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 16; see also
Golshan, supra note 11.
57 See Stephanie Bornstein, Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation, 104 MINN. L. REV.
811, 845-46 (2019); Bornstein, supra note 12, at 141.
58 See Bornstein, supra note 12, at 142-54 (citing scholarship and analyzing the impact of
intensified pleading standards, increased mandatory individual arbitration, and limited class
action employment discrimination claims on civil lawsuits).
59 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
60 Id. at 359-60 (rejecting class certification under Rule 23(a)(2), concluding that plaintiffs
could not demonstrate commonality without definitive evidence of “companywide
discriminatory pay and promotion,” and rejecting claims for backpay under Rule 23(b)(2)
because “monetary relief [was] not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief”).
54
55
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predispute arbitration agreements that force employees out of the courtroom,61
culminating in 2018’s Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,62 in which the Court upheld
even arbitration agreements that waive any and all class claims, forcing
employees into individual arbitration.63 Data shows that mandatory arbitration
agreements that include class action waivers are on the rise. One study estimated
that in 2018, 56.2% of the nonunionized, private-sector workforce was covered
by arbitration agreements, nearly one-third of which barred class actions.64
As a result of these trends, not only will fewer antidiscrimination cases be
litigated by private attorneys but also those that are pursued may be forced into
arbitration and largely shielded from public view, weakening their signaling
power to deter other violations and strengthen compliance.
II.

THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE AS A MEANS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
ENFORCEMENT

This Part provides the theoretical basis for moving beyond existing U.S.
enforcement mechanisms to require businesses to affirmatively produce
information on their own compliance with antidiscrimination law. Informationforcing mechanisms have been a required part of federal securities law for
decades, offering one example of the benefits and limitations of a disclosure
regime. More recently, the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements have
demonstrated the power of public exposure of harassment and discrimination
complaints, suggesting a need for greater transparency in workplace equality
measures. Both contexts provide rationales for imposing mandatory public
disclosure requirements as part of antidiscrimination law enforcement. Drawing
on these examples, this Part argues that compelled disclosure can improve
antidiscrimination law enforcement by increasing prevention ex ante, fostering
employer accountability, and expanding the government enforcement role
beyond gatekeeping for private lawsuits.
A.

The Lessons of Disclosure from Securities Law

For nearly a century, securities law has imposed mandatory disclosure
requirements on companies. Federal securities regulation began in the wake of
the Great Depression to serve the “national public interest” of restoring investor
faith in the stock market by protecting investors to, in turn, spark growth.65 To
curb the speculation and unchecked promises that had led to the 1929 stock
See Bornstein, supra note 57, at 845-46; Bornstein, supra note 12, at 141.
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
63 Id. at 1622-23 (enforcing arbitration agreement that waived employee’s right to pursue
class claims despite the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of “concerted activity”).
64 ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 2 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2YL-JVAS].
65 Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047-48 (2019) (quoting
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)).
61
62
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market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.66 The Acts created the SEC as the federal regulatory
agency overseeing federal securities law and required periodic disclosures.67
Both Acts required companies that sell public securities like stocks and bonds to
provide “truthful information” on the risks associated with investing, creating a
national disclosure regime.68
As it applies today, securities law requires disclosure of key information
reported up front at the company’s initial stock issuance and updated at regular
intervals. These disclosures are supported by an antifraud rule that requires that
the information disclosed is accurate and without material omissions.69
Disclosure requirements apply to certain covered entities—according to a recent
estimate, about 3,700 companies today.70 While the range of entities that must
comply with federal periodic disclosure requirements has evolved over time,71
the law today covers “all firms with securities traded on a national exchange,”
“most firms . . . once they execute[] a public securities offering,” and all firms
with over $10 million in assets and 2,000 shareholders.72
Federal securities law requires covered entities to make both public and
nonpublic disclosures to the SEC.73 To issue securities available for purchase by
the public, companies are required to publicly disclose information material to
the stock value, “including financial statements, business risks and prospects, a
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a; 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(d); see also Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act:
How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND.
L.J. 151, 163-164 (2013); What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo
.html#create [https://perma.cc/TPG7-TWQJ ] (last updated Dec. 18, 2020).
68 See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SECURITIES DISCLOSURE: BACKGROUND AND POLICY
ISSUES 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11256.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD9R-YR5D].
69 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); see also Sale, supra note 65, at 1048 (“The investor
protection goal is met on the front end with disclosure requirements that address required
disclosures and omissions.”).
70 Editorial Board, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-allthe-u-s-public-companies-gone.
71 See Guttentag, supra note 67, at 164-71 (describing changes to what entities must
comply with disclosure requirements enacted through additional legislation passed in 1936,
1964, 1999, and 2012).
72 Id. at 152-53, 164, 169 n.98 (citing Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No.
112-106, § 601, 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B)); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2020)) (discussing how, in 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act raised
threshold shareholder level to 2000 shareholders “so long as at least fifteen hundred . . . are
accredited investors” excluding “employees who received shares through a distribution
exempt from public offering requirements”); Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting
[https://perma.cc/H8TV-MYQ8] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018) (explaining which firms are
required to comply with disclosure requirements).
73 See SU, supra note 68, at 1-2.
66
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description of the stock to be offered for sale, and the management team and
their compensation.”74 Public disclosures are accessible to the public through
the SEC’s EDGAR online database.75 Covered entities must also provide
nonpublic disclosures to the SEC to allow the agency to monitor additional
issues, with the option to “release certain information in the aggregate [or] use
the information in enforcement actions.”76 When entities fail to comply with
disclosure requirements or to do so honestly, the SEC can enforce the law
through litigation seeking civil and criminal penalties.77
Notably, the disclosure of correct information is the only goal of the
disclosure regime; investors are left to make their own choices about an
investment’s risk or worthiness using that information.78 And while, in the past,
disclosure requirements focused on individual consumer investors, the
disclosure regime is largely now understood by scholars to provide information
to more sophisticated “information traders,” with the goal of efficiency in
financial markets and the economy overall.79
The system of securities disclosure requirements is not without its critics. It
has “detractors and counterarguments” and has been subject to “calls for changes
and overhauls.”80 Some commentators argue that existing regulations are either
not effective enough to be worth their cost81 or not rigorous enough to prevent
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d).
See About EDGAR, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about [https://perma.cc/W9DYT4W5] (last updated Aug. 24, 2020).
76 See SU, supra note 68, at 1-2.
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (d)(1); What We Do, supra note 67.
78 See Sale, supra note 65, at 1048-49 (“Indeed, the regulatory choice was to provide
investors with accurate information, not to develop a regime where regulators determined the
merits of the securities or entity.”).
79 Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchamovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713-14 (2006).
80 Sale, supra note 65, at 1051 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank:
Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 795 (2011); Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815 (1997); and Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation
and Securities Markets, REG., Spring 2003, at 32); see also infra Part IV.
81 For example, after eight years of fighting over how to implement the Dodd-Frank payratio rule (Section 953(b)), and related SEC regulations on executive compensation and
compensation ratios between the CEO and median employee, early evidence showed that data
was hard to compare and had little impact on investment recommendations or limitations on
CEO pay. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(i)); SU, supra
note 68, at 2 (noting that SEC studies costs and benefits of 10-Q quarterly reporting); Peter
Eavis, The Highest-Paid Executives Keep Getting Richer, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2019, at BU4;
Deb Lifshey, The CEO Pay Ratio: Data and Perspectives from the 2018 Proxy Season, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10
/14/the-ceo-pay-ratio-data-and-perspectives-from-the-2018-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc
/3D42-SU7X].
74
75
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market failures.82 Others argue that they are too investor oriented and propose
greater expansion of disclosures requirements to cover environmental, social,
and governance issues (“ESG”), such as environmental sustainability, political
activities, consumer protections, and labor relations.83 Countercriticism of ESGoriented disclosure expansion suggests that it is driven by special interest groups
with limited appeal to investors and limited relevance to the original purpose of
disclosures.84 Nevertheless, as Hillary Sale argues, the securities disclosure
regime provides enough utility in its primary objectives to reduce fraud and
stabilize the market and, despite its critics, “the system has remained firmly in
place.”85
Setting aside possible criticisms for the moment,86 this Section details the
main benefits of classic, traditional financial disclosure regimes as a point of
comparison for adopting disclosure in the separate regulatory scheme of
antidiscrimination law. The goal of required securities disclosures is not to
change corporate behavior. As such, it offers limited direct applicability to an
antidiscrimination regime. Yet, as part of a more comprehensive enforcement
scheme, some scholars of financial disclosure law identify several features that
may apply to imposing disclosure requirements in other contexts: (1) correcting
“information asymmetries,” (2) affecting the behavior of those responsible for
reporting, and (3) the impact of “publicness.”87
1.

Correcting Information Asymmetry

The defining feature of securities disclosure requirements is that they provide
a level playing field by correcting information asymmetry between those inside
the company who know about the inner workings of the company and those
Sale, supra note 65, at 1051 n.47.
See Ann M. Lipton, Mixed Company: The Audience for Sustainability Disclosures, 107
GEO L.J. ONLINE 81, 82-86 (2018) [hereinafter Lipton, Mixed Company]; Ann M. Lipton, Not
Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J.
REG. 499, 501-04, 561-72 (2020) [hereinafter Lipton, Not Everything]; see also Jennifer S.
Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583,
609 (2016); Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1669-70; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1289 (1999).
84 One example is what is known as the “conflict minerals rule.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)) (requiring disclosures about conflict materials
in or near Democratic Republic of the Congo). For more on criticism of this rule, see Hemel
& Lund, supra note 19, at 1668; David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized
Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 327, 330-31 (2011).
85 Sale, supra note 65, at 1051.
86 For discussion of and responses to these criticisms, see infra Sections III.B-C, IV.A.
87 See, e.g., Sale, supra note 65, at 1049-51; Lipton, Not Everything, supra note 83, at 51926; see also infra Section IV.A.
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outside either buying stock or impacted by the sale of its stock.88 The law aims
to protect investors and the efficiency of the market by providing information
important to investor decision-making that investors would otherwise lack.89
Placing the requirement to disclose this information on the companies
themselves is efficient; without it, countless investors and advisors would
duplicate efforts to search for the information they need to make informed
decisions—information that it is less costly for the firm itself to provide.90
Having a disclosure regime that requires information to be produced
according to set guidelines also ensures that the information produced and
published is standardized, which makes the information more useful for
comparisons. Investors, advisors, and the public can then compare investment
opportunities and risks.91 Because disclosed information is standardized and
made public, companies can also compare themselves to competitors, which
may motivate them to consider how they look “relative to [their] peers.”92
An analogous problem of information asymmetry occurs between employees
or applicants and employers, supporting the concept of creating affirmative
disclosure requirements in the context of antidiscrimination law. Employment
law scholars have long studied how employees’ lack of information negatively
affects their ability to bargain individually for protections related to job
security.93 More specifically, a lack of information about pay structures and what
other employees are paid has posed a particular problem that has contributed to
the racial and gender pay gaps.94 Indeed, employers often discourage their

Sale, supra note 65, at 1045-46.
See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1667-70; Sale, supra note 65, at 1047-50.
90 See Goshen & Parchamovsky, supra note 79, at 738 (“Mandatory disclosure duties
reduce the cost of searching for information. Absent mandatory disclosure duties, information
traders would engage in duplicative efforts to uncover nonpublic information. The cost of
these efforts would be extremely high because information traders, as outsiders, lack access
to the management of the firm. Disclosure duties pass these costs to the individual firm. For
the firm, the cost of obtaining firm-specific information is rather minimal; indeed, it is a mere
by-product of managing the firm.” (footnote omitted)).
91 See id. (noting that “securities regulation mandates a specific format for disclosure,
which further reduces the costs of analyzing information and comparing it to data provided
by other firms” (footnote omitted)); Sale, supra note 65, at 1049.
92 Sale, supra note 65, at 1050.
93 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1786-91 (1996) (describing “contractual assymmetries”
in employment relationship negotiations); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (providing “empirical evidence contradicting the
assumption of full information” and documenting that “workers appear to systematically
overestimate the protections afforded [them] by law”).
94 See infra Section II.B.
88
89
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employees from discussing pay in an effort to maintain negotiating leverage,95
despite the fact that doing so is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act.96
Requiring certain employers to provide information about racial and gender
distribution of pay and promotion opportunities and about the occurrence of
harassment or discrimination settlements can provide applicants and current
employees with information they otherwise lack. This may help applicants make
informed choices about where to work or may help those in a position to
negotiate pay to do so with an employer based on that employer’s data or that of
a competitor. Information on a peer entity’s equality measures may spur an
employer to further improvement as a competitive advantage. Employees and
enforcement entities have a great deal to gain by correcting information
asymmetries around pay, promotion, and harassment.
2.

Behavior-Forcing Effects

While the stated goal of securities disclosure requirements is investor
protection, a secondary feature of such requirements is the impact that having to
produce disclosures has on the behavior of regulated parties—what Sale and
colleagues have described as “the information-forcing-substance theory.”97 As
Sale describes it, by focusing on disclosure rather than trying to regulate for
“fairness,” securities laws and regulations “create incentives for directors to
engage in a dialogue with management about the basis for any disclosures.”98
The requirement to collect and produce information in turn may generate
“substantive behavior—discourse with officers and management and
potentially, changes in policies and procedures—on the part of directors.”99
Because they are required to produce accurate disclosures for which they can be
held accountable, company leadership may consider changing their actions—for
example, as Sale suggests, by making different decisions about how to invest
capital that could serve the company’s goals.100
Combining disclosure requirements with enforcement mechanisms further
strengthens these effects. Various provisions in securities law allow investors to
sue companies and their directors for “affirmative misstatements and
omissions.”101 One provision in particular, Section 11 of the Securities Act,

95 See, e.g., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., QUICK FIGURES: PAY SECRECY AND WAGE
DISCRIMINATION
1
(2014),
https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Q016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/642K-SK7C] (“About half of all workers . . . report that the discussion of
wage and salary information is either discouraged or prohibited and/or could lead to
punishment.”).
96 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a); see also infra Sections II.C.2, III.A.
97 Sale, supra note 65, at 1046-47.
98 Id. at 1047.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1050.
101 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(b), 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).
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imposes strict liability on directors who mislead, subject to affirmative defenses
for due diligence or acting with “candor.”102 These defenses provide further
incentives for a company’s directors to both ensure that management is making
accurate disclosures in the first place and to inform the SEC if management does
not.103 As a result, the duty to produce accurate periodic disclosures encourages
self-policing by directors and reduces “monitoring costs” for stockholders.104
Drawing an analogy for the purposes of considering equality disclosures, the
“information-forcing-substance” effects of disclosure requirements may
arguably be even stronger in the context of antidiscrimination law than for
securities law. First, many employers may be unaware of their own gender and
racial pay gaps or lack of diverse leadership until they are forced to collect
entity-wide data and see in the aggregate what are often made as a series of
discretionary decisions. As one business adage suggests, you treasure what you
measure;105 without an incentive to track pay and promotion differences by
gender and race, some employers may be unaware that they have an inequality
problem.106 Having to produce data on pay and promotion rates by protected
category may also expose unexamined patterns of bias or discrimination that
could open employers up to investigation by the EEOC or private lawsuits by
employees. Moreover, being confronted by such data because of a duty to
produce the disclosures has great potential to spark internal discussions and
possible policy change within an organization—either out of a commitment to
being more equitable, increased fear of liability, or the consequences of any
inequity being exposed publicly.
3.

“Publicness” Effects

Compelled disclosures in the securities context provide a related but separate
third value from what Sale calls their “publicness.”107 SEC-covered entities

102 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82-83 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. 77k); accord Sale, supra note 65, at 1059.
103 Sale, supra note 65, at 1059-61 (explaining that the candor defense “urges directors to
push back internally and, when unsuccessful, to make a noisy exit through resignation”).
104 Id. at 1050-51.
105 See Dave Lavinsky, The Two Most Important Quotes in Business, GROWTHINK,
https://www.growthink.com/content/two-most-important-quotes-business
[https://perma.cc/G25N-5N2X] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (crediting business management
expert Peter Drucker with saying, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it”).
106 Anecdotally, this was a result of several companies that expressed surprise at their own
data once required to produce it under new U.K. pay-data reporting requirements. See infra
Section III.A.1.
107 Sale, supra note 65, at 1065 (“Publicness is a concept that encompasses the interplay
between the inside players in the corporation (directors and officers) and outsiders—like
media and analysts—who cover the company.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101
GEO. L.J. 337, 374 (2013); Lipton, Not Everything, supra note 83, at 510. Arguments around
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produce disclosures that are published and accessible to third parties like the
media and financial analysts; those who are in “the zone of publicness” then help
contribute to accountability for businesses.108 For example, media coverage of
concealment or omissions in financial disclosures can lead to shareholder
lawsuits, state attorneys general investigations, and public-relations
consequences.109 Because of this, business managers who ignore the public
nature of their responsibilities to disclose required information accurately do so
at their peril.110
To the extent that any compelled equality disclosures are published,111 the
“publicness” effects may be even stronger than in the context of required
securities disclosures. Public exposure to the media and other interested third
parties may translate into additional legal and public-relations consequences for
employers with truly poor records of gender and racial equity and repeated
reports of harassment. For example, plaintiff’s attorneys may be more willing to
represent employees against an employer with a public record demonstrating a
significant racial or gender pay or promotion gap. Of course, the existence of a
gap in no way proves that discrimination, rather than real demographic or
performance differences, caused any individual pay or promotion decision;112
but, such data may indicate an employer’s blind spot for which a private attorney
may be willing to intervene. Media coverage of data that indicates egregious pay
or promotion gaps may also spur public activism, particularly for consumerfacing businesses—for example, a call to boycott or divest from a company.113
“publicness” are also consistent with scholars who have studied the reputational effects of
public exposure through litigation. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67
DUKE L.J. 907, 913 (2018) (describing the “information-transmission function of litigation:
litigation as a mechanism to disseminate information in society at large”); Roy Shapira,
Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing
Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2016) (arguing that information about litigation
against a company forces “the company’s stakeholders [to] update their beliefs about the
company and assess whether they want to continue doing business with it”). Relatedly, a
recent study documented that simply having a regulatory agency publicize legal violations
significantly improved compliance by both the violating entity and its peers. See Matthew S.
Johnson, Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace
Safety and Health Laws, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 1866, 1866-69 (2020) (documenting that, when
the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued press releases about employer
violations, “it led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance” and led “to
substantial improvements in workplace safety and health” overall).
108 Sale, supra note 65, at 1065-67.
109 Id. at 1065-68 (discussing consequences faced by Exxon and Wells Fargo for failing to
disclose problems related to climate change and legal issues, respectively).
110 Id.
111 This is an open question based on Title VII’s confidentiality requirements. See infra
Part III, Section IV.B.
112 See infra Section II.C.2, Part IV.
113 See, e.g., Joanne Moseley, Calls to Boycott Company with 64.8% Gender Pay Gap,
IRWIN MITCHELL (Jan. 18, 2018), https://imbusiness.passle.net/post/102eoby/calls-to-
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Thus, the public relations impact of any compelled equality disclosures may
spark additional reforms.
*****
Compelled disclosures in securities law serve a particular purpose and are not
directly applicable outside of the financial context. Nevertheless, the regime
provides useful theoretical underpinnings for this Article’s proposal to compel
employer disclosures under antidiscrimination law. Properly constructed,
equality disclosures could correct information asymmetry between employers
and employees and spur greater compliance efforts by employers faced with
having to produce such disclosures and experience their public consequences.
While securities disclosure law is neither a panacea for regulating business
entities nor directly applicable to the antidiscrimination context, it suggests
several strong rationales for the utility of a disclosure regime to combat
employment discrimination.
B.

The Lessons of Exposure from #MeToo and Time’s Up

While securities law provides the theoretical arguments for bringing a
disclosure regime to antidiscrimination law, the #MeToo and Time’s Up
movements demonstrate the overwhelming normative need to do so. Originally
founded in 2007 by advocate Tarana Burke as a movement to support survivors
of sexual assault, the #MeToo movement took on a new life when actress Alyssa
Milano used the hashtag #MeToo in a Twitter post in October 2017, calling for
people who had experienced sexual harassment or assault to respond “me
too.”114 Within 24 hours, the hashtag was used 12 million times.115 Within two
years, thousands of people had shared their stories of sexual harassment and
assault, and the issue of sexual harassment at work became a major public
concern.116 Public outcry over stories of egregious sexual harassment by men in

boycott-company-with-64-8-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/ADH6-A9GZ] (describing
how, after “the BBC reported on a number of high profile organisations that . . . revealed
gender pay gaps considerably above the national average,” British politician Jess Phillips
“call[ed] on her Twitter feed for women to ‘vote with their feet’ and boycott” retailer Phase
Eight, which was “singled out as the firm with the biggest gender pay gap (so far) - with a
64.8% lower mean hourly rate for female staff”); see also Jess Phillips MP (@jessphillips),
TWITTER
(Jan
7,
2018,
2:21
AM),
https://twitter.com/jessphillips/status
/949918947398299648 [https://perma.cc/ZJK2-6LRD].
114 Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-taranaburke.html; Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct 15, 2017, 4:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976
[https://perma.cc/YW4GB6T7].
115 Garcia, supra note 114.
116 Frances Perraudin, #MeToo Two Years On: Weinstein Allegations ‘Tip of Iceberg’, Say
Accusers, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
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leadership positions within the entertainment industry led to the ousting of
hundreds of men considered sexual predators at work, including Harvey
Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Mario Batali, Les Moonves, and more.117
As a result of the massive outpouring of stories of women’s exploitation at
work, a group of advocates launched a second organization, Time’s Up, to focus
on the issues of unequal pay and gender inequality in hiring and promotion.118
Again, public exposure of stories of unequal pay for female movie stars
including Jennifer Lawrence and Michelle Williams sparked policy changes by
agencies and movie studios, such as commitments to hiring more women.119
Both movements also inspired legislative reforms across the country.120
These social movements suggest two compelling arguments for the need to
adopt disclosure requirements in the antidiscrimination law context. First, they
provide an unprecedented level of documentation of the pervasive
underreporting of sexual and racial harassment and unequal pay and promotion
along racial and gender lines. While those who study discrimination have long
known that many incidents go unreported, the two movements showed, for the
first time, the massive scope of the problem and the widely pervasive fear of
retaliation and professional consequences that suppress reporting. Two books by
the investigative reporters who broke the story of the Harvey Weinstein
harassment and assault allegations document one example of the complex
institutional structures and systems of secrecy designed to protect powerful
executives accused of sexual harassment and the extreme forms of retaliation
that harassment accusers may face.121 Over three years after Alyssa Milano
encouraged use of the #MeToo hashtag—and over thirteen years after Tarana

/2019/oct/14/metoo-two-years-weinstein-allegations-tip-of-iceberg-accusers-zelda-perkinsrosanna-arquette [https://perma.cc/D99T-NP3C].
117 Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel
& Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their
Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html.
118 Our Story, TIME’S UP, https://timesupnow.org/about/our-story/ [https://perma.cc
/P9TK-ZVSD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
119 See Carlsen et al., supra note 117; Yohana Desta, Michelle Williams Says Pay-Gap
Controversy “Paralyzed” Her, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com
/hollywood/2019/04/michelle-williams-wage-gap-paycheck-fairness-act
[https://perma.cc/78KD-SP7B]; Jennifer Lawrence, Why Do I Make Less Than My Male
Co‑Stars?,
LENNY
(Oct.
13,
2015),
https://us11.campaign-archive.com/?u
=a5b04a26aae05a24bc4efb63e&id=64e6f35176&e=1ba99d671e#wage
[https://perma.cc/W5BK-LLCE].
120 See #MeToo, Time’s Up and the Legislation Behind the Movement, BILL TRACK 50
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/social-issues/civil-rights/metoo-times-upand-the-legislation-behind-the-movement [https://perma.cc/P6W3-DS9D].
121 RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT
PREDATORS (2019); JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT STORY THAT HELPED IGNITE A MOVEMENT (2019).
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Burke started the movement—there is simply no question that placing near-total
responsibility for pursuing harassment and discrimination complaints on
individual employees has a deeply chilling effect on antidiscrimination
enforcement.
Second, the severe consequences for sexual harassers whose victims finally
felt supported to report shows the power of public exposure of discrimination.
Once disclosed, the stories of inequality and exploitation led to swift, remedial
action. Only one year after the popularization of the #MeToo hashtag, the New
York Times reported that the movement had “brought down” over 200 “powerful
men.”122 Yet while public exposure led to a groundswell that shocked many
entities into action where passivity had otherwise set in, it did so in an ad hoc
way that was subject to criticism by some commentators for failing to meet
comport with due process.123
Regardless of individual procedural concerns, whether or not warranted,124 it
is accurate to say that the public exposure impacts of the #MeToo and Time’s
Up movements were massive and powerful but uncomprehensive and
individualized. Thus taking the power of exposure but systematizing it—
channeling it into a concrete and routinized disclosure regime that requires
employers to provide comparable information—offers a mechanism to harness
the power of sunshine with clear process protections.
A Role for Disclosures in Antidiscrimination Law

C.

In response to concerns over pervasive, unaddressed harassment and pay
discrimination, legal scholars have focused primarily on strengthening
antiretaliation protections and increasing pay transparency to encourage
employees to pursue private discrimination claims.125 This Section makes the
case that, while necessary, private ordering efforts are not sufficient;
antidiscrimination law enforcement requires a public law component to move
from reactive to proactive and from increasing transparency to fostering
accountability. Moreover, given chronic levels of underenforcement, the U.S.
government has an obligation to do more to protect citizens from workplace
discrimination than serve as a mere gatekeeper for victims to enforce the law
themselves—an obligation that a disclosure regime can help achieve.

Carlsen et al., supra note 117.
See Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 37-40
(describing due process criticisms).
124 Id. at 40-41 (arguing that not every #MeToo decision is procedurally sound but that
high-profile cases are safeguarded by extralegal norms).
125 See infra Section II.C.1.
122
123
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Retaliation Protections Are Not Enough: From Ex-Post to Ex-Ante
Action

To increase discrimination reporting, and in the wake of the #MeToo and
Time’s Up movements, some legal scholars have focused on increasing
discrimination complaints by strengthening antiretaliation law. Porter and
Sperino have suggested, among other reforms, extending retaliation protections
to cover complaints based on a “good faith” rather than a “reasonable” belief
that the law has been violated and broadening what constitutes a “materially
adverse action” to include a wider array of retaliatory harms.126 Brake has
proposed that, particularly in light of a growing backlash against harassment
complaints in the wake of #MeToo, retaliation law’s “expressive force” can help
set norms for “appropriate, non-retaliatory responses to sexual harassment
complaints.”127
While strengthening antiretaliation protections would be necessary and
warranted to improve antidiscrimination enforcement, it is not sufficient. When
employees are solely responsible for reporting harassment and discrimination,
they will always fear reprisals despite even the most robust antiretaliation
protections. As Porter explains, “the fear of retaliation is often enough to stop
an employee from reporting harassment”; despite believing that they could win
a retaliation lawsuit, most employees would “still choose to avoid the negative
consequences of retaliation in the first place.”128
Focusing on the problem of retaliation ex post, after discrimination remains
backward-looking and maintains near-total reliance on employee victims to
pursue complaints. Instead, the law should shift some reporting and compliance
requirements onto employers directly to reduce discrimination ex ante.
2.

Information Forcing in a Time of Secrecy: From Transparency to
Accountability

Likewise, to increase enforcement around pay discrimination, some legal
scholars and legislators have focused on the value of pay transparency129—the
idea that requiring employers to provide information to employees about
available pay and who is paid what can reduce gender-based pay gaps and
discrimination. For example, Cynthia Estlund has argued that pay transparency

See Porter, supra note 51, at 56-58; Sperino, supra note 52, at 2062-63.
See Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV.
1, 5 (2019).
128 Porter, supra note 51, at 58 (emphasis omitted).
129 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 986-98 (discussing the consequences of pay
secrecy); Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 783 (“[M]andatory disclosure of
meaningful salary information . . . tend[s] to produce less discrimination . . . and probably
somewhat lower disparities overall”); Lobel, supra note 17, at 548-50 (discussing the power
of correcting knowledge disparities on pay); Ramachandran, supra note 17, at 1062
(proposing pay transparency to help correct discrimination).
126
127
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can both “enhance employees’ bargaining power”130 and “aid in the enforcement
of antidiscrimination law” because “[n]o one can know whether she is the victim
of pay discrimination without comparing her pay to that of others.”131 Orly Lobel
has suggested that pay transparency reforms can “structurally change the ways
in which salaries are negotiated, determined, and, subsequently, detected, and
contested,” providing “a central innovation” of reversing information flows in
the wage market to correct information asymmetries.132
As this Article envisions it, a mandatory disclosure regime would be an
expansion of existing efforts to increase pay transparency. But, importantly,
while pay transparency is often raised in the context of private law and
individual negotiation, applying mandatory disclosures to a public regulatory
agency go beyond a private law scheme toward a more comprehensive approach
that can lead to greater public accountability.133 A chief goal of current pay
transparency efforts is their private ordering effects of information sharing to
support plaintiffs’ efforts at negotiation or to bring private lawsuits—for
example, as discussed in Part III, new state laws that require employers to
provide salary pay ranges to employees who request them when hired.134 A more
comprehensive public disclosure requirement can lead to greater accountability
across employers and industries as well as beyond individual actors.
In addition, compelled disclosure will address the particular need for public
reporting in an era when employment discrimination and harassment complaints
are increasingly resolved through confidential settlement and hidden arbitration.
If pay transparency’s main effect is to help individual employees discover
discrimination so that they can pursue litigation, its benefits to others are entirely
lost for any such claim covered by a mandatory arbitration agreement or that
results in a confidential settlement.135
3.

Enforcement Role of the State: From Gatekeeper to Enforcer

Lastly, the chronic underenforcement of antidiscrimination law indicates a
deeper problem at which a disclosure regime is aimed: U.S. law must do more
to enforce the rights of victims of discrimination and harassment than merely
facilitate their ability to sue privately. As legal scholars have documented, a

Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 788.
Id. at 785.
132 Lobel, supra note 17, at 549.
133 See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 783-85; Estlund, Just the Facts,
supra note 16, at 373-75; Lobel, supra note 17, at 600-05; infra Section III.B.
134 See Lobel, supra note 17, at 558-62 (noting how changes in hiring information impact
efforts to close the gender pay gap); infra Section III.A.1.
135 Nancy Modesitt, Why Pay Transparency Alone Won’t Eliminate the Persistent Wage
Gap Between Men and Women, CONVERSATION (Mar. 28, 2019, 4:12 PM),
https://theconversation.com/why-pay-transparency-alone-wont-eliminate-the-persistentwage-gap-between-men-and-women-113975 [https://perma.cc/AW92-4VDL].
130
131
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great deal of EEOC resources go to a mostly gatekeeping role,136 and
enforcement suffers when employees are left to their own devices to enforce the
federal laws that protect them from discrimination.137 Given fear of retaliation138
and U.S. models of litigation financing,139 relying on employees’ private
lawsuits as our main enforcement mechanism for civil rights law is not enough.
Both employers and the EEOC can and should play a larger role in ensuring that
workplaces are free from discrimination and harassment.
Adding a disclosure requirement is far from a comprehensive increase of
resources and public enforcement, but it does offer an incremental step. First, it
requires more of employer entities, forcing them to engage in public selfpolicing that may improve their behavior. Second, systematic collection of
information on the problem can help the EEOC and private enforcers target their
resources more effectively. Third, the information itself will help document the
scope of the problem in a verified, comprehensive way that tweets and individual
stories cannot, which may increase public awareness of the problem and political
support for a future increase in resources for public enforcement. Particularly in
an era of increasing mandatory arbitration clauses and confidential settlements,
public documentation is essential to exposing racial and gender discrimination
and harassment, which remain systemic problems with structural components
that we have failed to adequately redress.140
III. MODELS FOR FORCING DISCLOSURE OF DISCRIMINATION
This Article has provided both the normative case for the need to rebalance
enforcement responsibility for antidiscrimination law and the theoretical case
for using compelled disclosures on equality measures as a means of doing so.
This Part now turns to the practical challenge of crafting affirmative disclosure
requirements for employers under federal law, focusing on three key areas of
persistent racial and gender inequality: pay, promotion, and harassment.141 To

See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 6, at 646-52.
See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 6, at 861-62 (noting that “at many different
junctures” of the rights-claiming process, “employees are stymied and deterred in their efforts
to take [the] initiative” to come forward to enforce antidiscrimination laws). See generally
ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON, & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2017) (documenting the
limitations of an adversarial approach to workplace discrimination law that relies on
employee-initiated litigation).
138 See supra Section I.B.
139 See supra Section I.A.
140 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1678 (“[I]f securities law forces publicly traded
companies to disclose large sexual harassment settlements or allegations against executives,
those revelations—insofar as they supply further evidence of the problem’s prevalence—may
add further fuel to the push for legal reform.”).
141 Notably, as explained previously, this Article focuses on mandatory reporting
requirements to governmental regulators. As such, this Part does not discuss the role of
136
137
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do so, this Part looks to examples of similar disclosure laws recently enacted in
other high-income countries, as well as emerging models in some U.S. state
laws. It then proposes a framework for requiring disclosures under U.S. federal
law, identifying and building upon equality-related data already collected by
some federal government agencies. As this Part argues, creating a cohesive
mandatory disclosure scheme under federal antidiscrimination law does not
require starting from scratch but rather expanding and improving current efforts,
with the potential to vastly improve enforcement.
A.

Pay Data to Close Gender and Racial Pay Gaps

Pay inequality by gender and race is a persistent, seemingly intractable
problem that current antidiscrimination law has failed to solve, as underscored
by the Time’s Up movement. It has been nearly six decades since federal law
prohibited discrimination in pay by sex and race,142 yet significant gender and
racial pay gaps remain.143 In the most recent data, when comparing all women
to all men working full time all year, women earned only eighty-two cents on
the dollar to men, an 18% pay gap.144 For women of color, the pay gap is even
greater: Black women make sixty-two cents and Latinx women fifty-four cents
to each dollar earned by White men, 38% and 46% gaps respectively.145 The
racial pay gap between White men and men of color is also stark; in recent data
comparing median pay, Black and Latinx men earned just seventy-one cents on
the dollar compared to White men, a whopping 29% gap in average pay.146 Most
troublingly, both gender and racial pay gaps have been stuck at close to these
ratios for over two decades.147 Of course, a significant portion of both racial and
gender pay gaps are caused not by discrimination but by actual demographic
differences, including differences in experience and education (for racial pay
gaps) and working hours (for gender pay gaps).148 Yet even after adjusting the

voluntary disclosures by business entities either to the public or to their own employees—
topics that are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on public enforcement efforts to relieve
the enforcement burden on individual employees. For more on private law arguments, see
sources cited supra note 17.
142 See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 247
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
143 See Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 590-92 (2018).
144 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP: FALL
2019 UPDATE 1 (2019) [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH], https://ww3.aauw.org/aauw
_check/files/2016/02/Simple-Truth-Update-2019_v2-002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QM5SB5F].
145 See Bornstein, supra note 143, at 591-92.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 592-93.
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data to account for all such differences, pay gaps remain.149 Economists now
attribute between one-third and one-half of both gender and racial pay gaps to
workforce segregation and discrimination,150 causes that antidiscrimination law
should be able to reach and remedy.
A mandatory disclosure requirement that collects and publishes pay data by
race and gender stands to have a dramatic effect on exposing and rooting out the
portion of the racial and gender pay gaps that result from discrimination. Recent
data shows that the gender pay gap is smaller when salary information is
transparent and known like, for example, in the federal public sector.151 Yet
sharing information among employees and within an individual employer is only
the first step.152 Reaping the full benefit of pay transparency requires a
comprehensive approach in which employers are required to report pay data
publicly and in a consistent fashion to force greater internal accountability and
provide comparable data for employees, enforcers, and the public.153
1.

Current Comparative Examples

The move to combat the gender pay gap globally has sparked a number of pay
data collection laws. Over the past decade, spurred by their own persistent
gender pay gaps and a 2014 recommendation by the European Commission to
member states,154 over a dozen European and other high-income countries have
enacted some form of pay-data reporting requirements on large employers.155

Id. at 594.
Id. at 585, 587-88.
151 See, e.g., THE SIMPLE TRUTH, supra note 144, at 3 (“The pay gap is smaller for workers
in sectors where pay transparency is mandated: For example, federal government workers
experience a 13% pay gap between men and women; in the private, for-profit sector, that
number jumps to 29%.”). Notably, both union and federal-sector workers also have banded
pay ranges, which are a large part of why their pay gaps are smaller. See Bornstein, supra
note 143, at 638.
152 See Modesitt, supra note 135; supra Section II.C.2.
153 See supra Sections II.A, II.C.2.
154 Lynne Bernabei & Kristen Sinisi, Gender Pay Data: Impact of European Laws in the
US, LAW360 (May 11, 2018 11:40 AM), https://www.law360.com/publicpolicy/articles
/1041706.
155 As of April 2019, these include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See
WORKPLACE GENDER EQUAL. AGENCY, AUSTL. GOV’T, INTERNATIONAL GENDER EQUALITY
REPORTING SCHEMES 11 (2019) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES],
https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2019-044%20International%20reporting%20schemes_Final_for_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3U32ZCF]. Some provinces of Canada and India have related laws as well. See DLA PIPER,
GENDER PAY REPORTING: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (SEPTEMBER 2018), at 11-19, 32-35
(2018),
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/events/2018/11/international
_gender_pay_gap_report_2018_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7H4-LJC7]; see also EUR.
COMM’N, PAY TRANSPARENCY: TIME TO SEE THE GAP! 4 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites
149
150
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These reporting schemes range from imposing light to moderate to robust
obligations on employer entities.156 As such, they provide a variety of
approaches from which U.S. law could draw.
On the lightest touch side of this spectrum, several countries require that
employers collect and report data on gender pay gaps internally to
representatives from unions or employee “councils,” who then “monitor the
status” of gender pay equality at the firm.157 For example, Austria requires
employers of 150 or more employees to provide a report on “gender composition
and income data” to internal “work council[s]” or, if none, all employees every
two years.158 While such an approach offers pay transparency, it relies on a
robust system of unions or work councils, which the United States lacks,159 or
private enforcement, with its challenges described previously.160
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iceland requires even small companies
to certify that their pay structures comply with government standards for equal
pay, representing the strongest equal pay protection laws to date.161 In 2017,
Iceland enacted requirements that all employers of twenty-five or more
employees conduct a pay audit in accordance with government standards to
receive an official equal pay “certification” from the government.162 Employers
/info/files/factsheet-pay_transparency-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9PZ-GR66]; The Gender
Pay Gap Situation in the EU, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-andfundamental-rights/gender-equality/equal-pay/gender-pay-gap-situation-eu_en#differencesbetween-the-eu-countries [https://perma.cc/D4YX-C9VG] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
156 INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES, supra note 155, at 5. In a recent report, the
Australian Government’s Workplace Gender Equality Agency analyzed these laws as falling
into five categories (listed here from weakest to strongest): (1) “[l]imited external
transparency,” requiring reporting of gender pay gaps to “internal work councils”;
(2) “[c]omprehensive,” requiring submission of data on multiple indicators to a federal
agency; (3) “[t]ransparency,” requiring reporting on gaps to a government agency for
publication; (4) “[t]ransparency and accountability,” requiring public reporting plus
“demonstrate[d] actions to close gender pay gaps”; and (5) “[l]egislation,” requiring
certification of compliance with government equal pay standards. Id.
157 Id. at 11.
158 Id. at 12; accord BUNDES-GLEICHBEHANDLUNGSGESETZ [B-GBG] [FEDERAL EQUAL
TREATMENT ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 100/1993 (Austria).
159 Eric Morath, U.S. Union Membership Hits Another Record Low, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22,
2020, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-union-membership-hits-another-recordlow-11579715320 (explaining that in 2019, only 10.3% of U.S. workforce and 6.2% of private
sector employees are union members according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
160 See supra Part I, Section II.C.1.
161 INTERNATIONAL REPORTING SCHEMES, supra note 155, at 9.
162 ÞORSTEINN VÍGLUNDSSON, REGULATION: THE CERTIFICATION OF EQUAL PAY SYSTEMS
OF COMPANIES AND INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ÍST 85 STANDARD, No. 1030, art. 7
(2017),
https://www.government.is/library/04-Legislation/Regulation
_CertificatinOfEqualPaySytems_25012018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PW8Y-PQX4];
VELFERÐARRÁÐUNEYTIÐ MINISTRY OF WELFARE, ACT ON EQUAL STATUS AND EQUAL RIGHTS
OF WOMEN AND MEN, NO. 10/2008, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 56/2017, art. 19 (2014),
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must submit their pay data to a third-party “accredited auditor” that reviews and
certifies that their compensation system complies with the government’s
“Standard ÍST 85.”163 Certification demonstrates “that wages paid by the
company . . . are at all times determined in the same way for women and men,
and that the considerations on which decisions on wage are based do not involve
discrimination on grounds of gender.”164 Companies that fail to submit their data
within four years of the law’s effective date of January 2018 may be subject to
daily fines for noncompliance.165 While certainly the most likely to correct any
discrimination in pay, such a heavy-handed policy that interferes with employer
discretion about pay setting is likely to be a nonstarter in the United States.166
Toward the middle of this spectrum, several countries impose a moderate
requirement, combining transparency with accountability through government
https://www.government.is/library/04-Legislation/Act%20on%20equal%20status%20and
%20equal%20rights%20of%20women%20and%20men%20no%2010%202008%20as%20a
mended%200101%202018%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6D6-CBBK]; Equal Pay
Certification, GOV’T ICE., https://www.government.is/topics/human-rights-and-equality
/equal-pay-certification/ [https://perma.cc/DZ9C-7UGV] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also
Lauren Collins, What Women Want, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2018, at 34, 42 (“The law is
innovative because it makes employers actively justify their policies, rather than relying on
regulators to seek out violations. It doesn’t change the law so much as enforce it.”).
163 Equal Pay Certification, supra note 162.
164 Id. (click “03. What is equal pay certification?”).
165 Jon Henley, ‘Equality Won’t Happen By Itself’: How Iceland Got Tough on Gender
Pay Gap, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2018, 3:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2018/feb/20/iceland-equal-pay-law-gender-gap-women-jobs-equality
[https://perma.cc/8TRC-T68L].
166 See Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason, Catherine R. Albiston &
Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOCIO. 888, 894 (2011) (documenting how “judges simply
defer to the [organizational] structure, assuming that the mere presence of the structure means
that the organization is complying with civil rights law”); Jordain Carney, McConnell Pledges
to Be ‘Grim Reaper’ for Progressive Policies, HILL (Apr. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/440041-mcconnell-pledges-to-be-grim-reaper-forprogressive-policies [https://perma.cc/2ZD3-UX2F]. However, one U.S. state comes close to
something of this sort in its public contracting. In Minnesota, employers of 40 or more who
seek to obtain a contract from the state government for a value of $500,000 or more must
complete an Equal Pay Certification from the state that requires the employer to certify, inter
alia,
that the average compensation for its female employees is not consistently below the
average compensation for its male employees within each of the major job categories in
the EEO-1 employee information report for which an employee is expected to perform
work under the contract, taking into account factors such as length of service,
requirements of specific jobs, experience, skill, effort, responsibility, working conditions
of the job, or other mitigating factors.
MINN. STAT. § 363A.44(2)(a)(2) (2020); see also Equal Pay Certificate, MINN. DEP’T OF HUM.
RTS., https://mn.gov/mdhr/certificates/apply-renew/equal-pay-certificate/ (last visited Dec.
28, 2020).
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publication—a model likely most appropriate for informing U.S. federal law. In
2016, the United Kingdom passed new regulations to its Equality Act requiring
private employers of 250 or more to report gender pay gap data annually.167 The
Act went into effect on April 6, 2017, with the first reporting required one year
later in April 2018.168 Covered companies must collect data as a “snapshot”
every April 5 on hourly and bonus pay and on earnings ranges by gender.169
They must then follow instructions to calculate and produce data on six
measures: mean and median pay gaps by gender in both hourly and bonus pay,
proportion of each gender receiving a bonus, and proportion of each gender
earning each quartile of pay.170 Once complete, employers must publish these
six calculations along with a written statement describing their results on their
own “public-facing website” and report their data to the U.K. government’s
“gender pay gap reporting service,” where it is also made public.171 Any failure
to produce accurate data on time may be subject to “legal action from the
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), leading to court orders and
fines.”172 The law goes beyond pay transparency for employees’ and applicants’
own information; by “increasing public scrutiny” of each company’s gender pay
disparities,173 it creates accountability likely to spur internal change.174
While only recently enacted, data on the impact of the British approach has
been stark. Anecdotally, in the months after the first reports were due in April
2018, companies that discovered their own significant gender pay gaps only after
complying with the reporting requirements promised to improve gender
equality.175 After reporting the largest average gender pay gap in the country’s
media industry—37%—despite having three times more female than male

167 The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172,
art. 2 (U.K.).
168 Amie Tsang, New Rule Aims to Close Pay Gap in British Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2017, at B2.
169 The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172,
art. 2 (U.K.); see also Collins, supra note 162, at 40.
170 Guidance: Gender Pay Gap Reporting: Make Your Calculations, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/gender-pay-gap-reporting-make-your-calculations
[https://perma.cc/Y7DY-R24Y] (last updated Mar. 25, 2020).
171 Search and Compare Gender Pay Gap Data, GOV.UK, https://gender-paygap.service.gov.uk [https://perma.cc/6Z84-VUX6] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); Guidance;
Gender Pay Gap Reporting: Overview, GOV.UK [hereinafter UK Overview],
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/gender-pay-gap-reporting-overview [https://perma.cc/2K95KP3N] (last updated Mar. 25, 2020) (summarizing reporting requirements for covered U.K.
companies).
172 UK Overview, supra note 171.
173 Collins, supra note 162, at 40; see also Liz Alderman, Britain Aims to Close Pay Gap
with Transparency and Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2018, at B1.
174 See supra Section II.A.
175 Collins, supra note 162, at 41.
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employees,176 publishing giant Condé Nast promised to correct the significant
gap in their top quartile of earnings due in part to male-dominated leadership.177
After disclosing a nearly 52% mean gender pay gap, the CEO of the airline
EasyJet took a voluntary £34,000 pay cut to reduce his pay to that earned by his
female predecessor, reflecting his “‘personal commitment’ to equality.”178
Quantitative data showed that, at the first-year reporting deadline of April
2018, 80% of approximately 10,000 employers reporting had a gender pay gap,
nearly one-third of which reported a pay gap over the United Kingdom’s 18.4%
national median.179 One year later, little had changed, with the same 80% of
employers reporting a pay gap and “negligible” improvement in the average gap,
shrinking from 9.7% in 2018 to 9.6% in 2019.180 This was largely attributable to
the lack of women in the highest paid quartile, another statistic that moved in
miniscule fashion from 2018 to 2019, from 37% to 38% of earners in reporting
employers’ top pay quartiles.181 Those working on pay-gap issues anticipated
that change would not happen overnight and instead that trends would improve
after several years.182
Yet there is no doubt that collecting and publishing the data is starting to have
an impact, particularly on high-profile individual employers. For example, the
Guardian News and Media group committed to increasing gender diversity in
the leadership ranks of their organization and successfully reduced their gender
176 Corinne Purtill, Condé Nast Has More Women than Men at Every Pay Grade and Still
Has a Gender Pay Gap, QUARTZ AT WORK (Apr. 5, 2018), https://qz.com/work
/1245980/conde-nast-uk-gender-pay-gap-men-still-earn-more-than-women-at-every-level
/#:~:text=Cond%C3%A9%20Nast%20has%20more%20women,has%20a%20gender%20pa
y%20gap&text=Almost%2080%25%20of%20reporting%20employers,their%20female%20
co%2Dworkers%20do [https://perma.cc/778C-QQU5]; see also Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay
Gap Figures in Full: Conde Nast, Telegraph and Economist Groups Among Worst Offenders
for Pay Disparity in UK Media, PRESS GAZETTE (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.pressgazette.co.ukv/gender-pay-gap-figures-in-full-conde-nast-telegraph-andeconomist-groups-among-worst-offenders-for-pay-disparity-in-uk-media/
[https://perma.cc/S94K-74KG].
177 Collins, supra note 162, at 40; Tobitt, supra note 176.
178 Collins, supra note 162, at 40.
179 Alexandra Topping, Caelainn Barr & Pamela Duncan, Gender Pay Gap Figures Reveal
Eight in 10 UK Firms Pay Men More, GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:14 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2018/apr/04/gender-pay-gap-figures-reveal-eight-in10-uk-firms-pay-men-more [https://perma.cc/76PR-XJ6D].
180 Caelainn Barr, Niko Kommenda & Caroline Davies, Gender Pay Gap: What Did We
Learn This Year?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/ng-interactive/2019/apr/05/gender-pay-gap-what-did-we-learn-this-year
[https://perma.cc/JW5W-MDGT].
181 Id.
182 Id. (“Helene Reardon Bond, gender pay gap consultant and former head of policy at the
Government Equalities Office, said a big reduction in the gender pay gap of most
organisations was unlikely. ‘It will take a few years for the trends to appear and for meaningful
action and good practice to kick in,’ she said.”).
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pay gap from 12.1% in 2017 to 8.4% in 2018 and 4.9% in 2019, cutting their
gap by more than half over just two years.183 But Condé Nast and EasyJet, both
shocked at the gaps they discovered when reporting in 2017, showed mixed
results in 2018: Condé Nast decreased their average hourly wage gap from 37%
to 31%,184 but EasyJet’s gap increased from 51.7% to 54%.185 A lack of
improvement spurred further action in some industries, including attracting
signatories to the United Kingdom’s Women in Finance Charter, to which over
330 companies in the financial services sector have pledged.186 Indeed, the data
collection and publication process will likely have its ups and downs and take
several years to show real progress, but there is no doubt that the law has made
a significant impact on measuring and beginning to address unequal pay. To
date, the EU has not required the same data collection by race or ethnicity but
has begun to explore the issue.187 And more than a dozen top employers signed
a pledge to voluntarily provide such data in the wake of the gender-pay-gap
reporting requirements and assist others who wish to do so with a toolkit.188
183 Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay Gap Figures 2018: Telegraph, Reuters, ITN, Guardian,
BBC and FT Publish Reduced Wage Gaps + Full List So Far, PRESS GAZETTE (July 17, 2018),
https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/gender-pay-gap-figures-2018-guardian-bbc-and-ft-firstmedia-organisations-to-publish-reduced-wage-gaps-full-list-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/F8HX69RR]; Charlotte Tobitt, Gender Pay Gap: Pay Disparity Increased at Six in Ten UK News
Media Companies in 2019, PRESS GAZETTE (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.pressgazette.co.uk
/gender-pay-gap-pay-disparity-increased-at-six-in-ten-uk-news-media-companies-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/4N2F-8UKR].
184 Compare Conde Nast Publications Limited (The): Gender Pay Gap Report, GOV.UK
(Apr.
5,
2017),
https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer/ndQZEJnl/2017
[https://perma.cc/Q23B-QZE2], with Conde Nast Publications Limited (The): Gender Pay
Gap Report, GOV.UK (Apr. 5, 2018), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer
/ndQZEJnl/2018 [https://perma.cc /CJZ7-2QMU].
185 Compare EasyJet Airline Company Limited: Gender Pay Gap Report, GOV.UK (Apr.
5,
2017),
https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer/EMxvV2qy/2017
[https://perma.cc/SX29-NXQV], with EasyJet Airline Company Limited: Gender Pay Gap
Report, GOV.UK (Apr. 5, 2018), https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/Employer
/EMxvV2qy/2018 [https://perma.cc/76EC-T3NM].
186 HM TREASURY, WOMEN IN FINANCE CHARTER (2020), https://assets.publishing.service
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/519620/women
_in_finance_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ8G-N2NL]; see also Barr, Kommenda &
Davies, supra note 180 (“John Glen, economic secretary to the Treasury, said: ‘Gender pay
gap reporting has shone a light on the inequalities women experience, and it’s clear that the
financial sector needs to take swift action to get its house in order.’”).
187 See LORNA ADAMS, AOIFE NI LUANAIGH, DOMINIC THOMSON & HELEN ROSSITER,
EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT 117, MEASURING AND REPORTING ON
DISABILITY AND ETHNICITY PAY GAPS 23-45 (2018), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com
/sites/default/files/measuring-and-reporting-on-ethnicity-and-disability-pay-gaps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HWL-54NZ].
188 See Cassie Werber, 15 UK Companies Have Volunteered to Report Their Ethnicity Pay
Gaps, QUARTZ AT WORK (Feb. 28, 2019), https://qz.com/work/1562321/15-uk-companieswill-report-their-ethnicity-pay-gaps/ [https://perma.cc/4DJA-ET9L].
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While such global efforts may provide the best models for a U.S. federal law,
some U.S. states have started to legislate in this area. To date, at least sixteen
states have enacted pay transparency laws that prohibit employers from
penalizing employees from sharing or inquiring about pay.189 Notably, the
federal National Labor Relations Act also protects covered employees in this
matter.190 At least seventeen states have also banned employers from asking job
applicants about their prior salaries, which aims to improve pay equity in starting
salaries.191 Yet only three states have enacted salary-information-disclosure
laws, all aimed at individual applicants. Colorado192 requires job postings to
disclose pay range and benefits; California193 and Washington194 require an
employer to provide information on pay scale for a position offered upon the
employee’s request.
Lastly, New York has introduced195 and California has recently enacted196
legislation requiring more comprehensive pay data disclosure to state regulators.
The California law, enacted in October 2020 and taking effect in March 2021,
requires private employers of 100 or more employees—that are already

189 See Equal Pay and Pay Transparency Protections, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WOMEN’S BUREAU,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/equal-pay-protections
[https://perma.cc/5QGD-4ZY6]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (providing that state pay-transparency protections are available
for employees in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
and Washington, D.C.).
190 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 7-8, 49 Stat. 449,
452-53 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158(a)).
191 See Your Guide to Salary History Laws by State and Locality, SALARY.COM,
https://www.salary.com/resources/guides/salary-history-inquiry-bans/
[https://perma.cc/5HP9-NCCK] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (listing seventeen “state-wide
salary history bans”); e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2020); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 112
(2019); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a (McKinney 2020).
192 S.B. 19-085, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-5201(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021).
193 LAB. § 432.3(c) (“An employer, upon reasonable request, shall provide the pay scale
for a position to an applicant applying for employment. For purposes of this section, ‘pay
scale’ means a salary or hourly wage range. For purposes of this section ‘reasonable request’
means a request made after an applicant has completed an initial interview with the
employer.”).
194 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.58.110(1) (2020) (“Upon request of an applicant for
employment after the employer has initially offered the applicant the position, the employer
must provide the minimum wage or salary for the position for which the applicant is
applying.”).
195 S.B. S4065, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). In addition, a separate bill has
been introduced to track pay data among New York state contractors. S.B. S1482, 2019-2020
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
196 S.B. 973, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
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compelled to provide some data to federal agencies197—to provide pay data by
sex, race, and ethnicity in ten occupational categories to the state fair
employment practices agency, which can make reports available to the state
labor department when requested.198 While data is not made public generally,
the state agencies may, but are not required to, “develop, publish, . . . and
publicize aggregate reports based on the data obtained . . . , provided that the
aggregate reports are reasonably calculated to prevent the association of any data
with any individual business or person.”199 New York’s proposed bill includes
similar provisions.200
Thus, looking at a variety of international models and early movement in the
states provides a rich background to support federal efforts around meaningful
pay data collection.
2.

Requiring Pay-Data Disclosures in U.S. Law

At the federal level, some limited data collection has been required of larger
companies and those receiving federal contracts for decades. Since 1966, just
after the enactment of Title VII, federal law has required certain employers to
disclose basic data on employees by gender, race, and job category through its
Standard Form 100 or Employer Information Report EEO-1 (“EEO-1”).201 The
relevant section of Title VII states that every employer or entity subject to the
statute “[s]hall . . . make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of
whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being
committed . . . and . . . make such reports therefrom as the Commission shall
prescribe by regulation or order . . . as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for
the enforcement of [Title VII].”202
Under the implementing regulations to this section, the EEOC is authorized
to collect EEO-1 forms from all private employers with 100 or more
employees.203 Under Executive Order 11,246, the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) is authorized to collect EEO-1 forms from
all private federal contractors with fifty or more employees that receive federal
197 The California law applies to “a private employer that has 100 or more employees and
who is required to file an annual Employer Information Report (EEO-1) pursuant to federal
law.” Id. § 3(a). Federal EEO-1 reports are discussed in the next section. See infra notes 20109 and accompanying text.
198 Cal. S.B. 973, § 3.
199 Id. § 3(k); see also Pay Data Reporting, CAL. DEP’T FAIR EMP. & HOUS.,
https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/paydatareporting [https://perma.cc/JCQ9-T8QG] (last updated Nov.
23, 2020).
200 N.Y. S.B. S4065, § 1.
201 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-.14 (2020); EEO-1: Who Must File,
EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-survey/eeo-1-who-must-file
[https://perma.cc/36DY-7EYJ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
202 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c).
203 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7.
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contracts worth $50,000 or more.204 Covered entities must complete the form
annually, providing a snapshot of racial and gender demographics of the
workforce and identifying the gender (male or female) and race (from seven
categories)205 of employees in ten different job types.206 The two agencies use
this information internally to track compliance, inform investigations, and create
periodic aggregated public reports about trends in workforce demographics.207
Parties to litigation may seek to discover EEO-1 reports and use them either
offensively (employees) or defensively (employers) to support or defend against
claims of discrimination.208 In addition, for federal contractors, the OFCCP
conducts periodic “compliance evaluations,” in which it can request “up-to-date,
employee-level pay data from contractors,” which “enables OFCCP to identify
disparities in pay that may violate Executive Order 11,246 by comparing the pay
of employees who are similarly situated under the contractors’ pay practices.”209
Given the persistence of gender and racial pay gaps, after several years of
considering the option, in 2016, the EEOC under the Obama Administration
used its regulatory authority210 to expand data collected on the EEO-1 as a means

204 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (2019); see also
Pamela Wolf, OFCCP Does Not Want Any EEO-1 Pay Data, WOLTERS KLUWER (Nov. 25,
2019), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/employment-law-daily/ofccp-does-not-want-any
-eeo-1-pay-data/99960/ [https://perma.cc/TX89-X78D].
205 The seven racial categories are Hispanic or Latino, White, Black or African American,
Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or
Two or more races. See EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: EMPLOYER INFORMATION
REPORT EEO—1 (2006) [hereinafter SAMPLE EEO-1], https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default
/files/migrated_files/employers/eeo1survey/eeo1-2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CY3-7FMK];
see also EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey
/2007instructions.cfm [https://perma.cc/83US-2Q6F] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
206 These ten job types are Executive/Senior Level Officials and Managers, First/MidLevel Officials and Managers, Professionals, Technicians, Sales Workers, Administrative
Support Workers, Craft Workers, Operatives, Laborers and Helpers, and Service Workers.
SAMPLE EEO-1, supra note 205; see also EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205.
207 Robert W. Sikkel, What EEO-1 Reports Really Tell Us, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2004,
at 17; see also, e.g., EEOC, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT (2003),
https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/eeoc/statistics/reports/ceosummit/ch
aracteristics.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8ZN-ZM95]. In fact, the statute requires that individual
data be kept confidential. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
208 Sikkel, supra note 207, at 20-22.
209 Intention Not To Request, Accept, or Use Employer Information Report (EEO–1)
Component 2 Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,932, 64,933 (Nov. 25, 2019) (noting also that “OFCCP
will continue to receive EEO–1 Component 1 data from covered contractors and
subcontractors through the Joint Reporting Committee for purposes of reviewing their
compliance with Executive Order 11246 and its implementing regulations, including the
reporting requirements at 41 CFR 60–1.7”); see also Wolf, supra 204.
210 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1602.11 (2020) (“The Commission
reserves the right to require reports, other than that designated as the Employer Information
Report EEO–1, about the employment practices of individual employers or groups of
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of improving enforcement efforts.211 The EEOC held formal public hearings212
and then went through the Notice and Comment process to amend the form,
explaining,
[P]ay discrimination persists as a serious problem that EEOC and OFCCP
are statutorily required to address. The EEOC’s mission is to stop and
remedy unlawful employment discrimination. . . . [The agencies] now lack
the employer- and establishment-specific pay data that, prior to issuing a
detailed request for information or a subpoena, would be extremely useful
in helping enforcement staff to investigate potential pay discrimination.
Balancing utility and burden, the EEOC has concluded that the proposed
EEO–1 pay data collection would be an effective and appropriate tool for
this purpose . . . .
Using aggregated EEO–1 data, . . . the EEOC expects to periodically
publish reports on pay disparities by race, sex, industry, [and] occupational
groupings . . . .
The EEOC’s publication of aggregated pay data, in conjunction with the
employer’s preparation of the EEO–1 report itself, may be useful tools for
employers to engage in voluntary self-assessment of pay practices.213
As required under the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”), the EEOC sought,
and was granted, permission from the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) to revise the standard EEO-1 form to add fields collecting summary
pay data.214 This data was referred to as “Component 2” data, while the
employers whenever, in its judgment, special or supplemental reports are necessary to
accomplish the purposes of title VII . . . .”).
211 The Obama Administration also sought to expand pay transparency among federal
contractors through two Executive Orders. First, Executive Order 13,665, which remains in
effect, prohibits most federal contractors receiving $10,000 or more from firing or penalizing
any applicant or employee for “inquir[ing] about, discuss[ing], or disclos[ing]” their or others’
pay. Exec. Order No. 13,665, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,749, 20,749 (Apr. 11, 2014). Second, Executive
Order 13,673 required that any entity receiving a federal contract for over $500,000 provide
regular wage statements to workers and disclose any resolutions against them under Title VII
or other labor laws in the prior three years; it also barred any contracts in excess of $1 million
from requiring arbitration of Title VII claims or tort claims for sexual harassment or assault
without voluntary consent by the claimant. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309,
45,309-14 (Aug. 5, 2014). Upon taking office, President Trump issued his own Executive
Order 13,782, which revoked these provisions of Executive Order 13,673. Exec. Order No.
13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607, 15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017).
212 See, e.g., Hearing of March 16, 2016 - Public Input into the Proposed Revisions to the
EEO-1 Report, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/hearing-march-16-2016-public-input
-proposed-revisions-eeo-1-report [https://perma.cc/6MGD-3YLA] (last visited Dec. 28,
2020).
213 Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review,
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed.
Reg. 45,479, 45,483, 45,491 (July 14, 2016).
214 See id. at 45,492.

2021]

DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION

325

traditional EEO-1 data collected on jobs by race and sex without pay information
was referred to as “Component 1” data.215 To collect Component 2 information,
the EEO-1 form was revised in two ways. First, where employers already
provided racial and gender data on employees in each of eleven job categories,
it subdivided those listed in each category by pay, requiring each employee to
be listed in one of twelve pay bands ranging from “$19,239 and under” to
“$208,000 and over.”216 Second, using the same pay bands, job categories, and
racial categories, it required employers to report work hours.217 Thus without
dramatically revising the form, it added a granular detail on both pay and work
hours. In September 2016, the OMB approved the change, and the Component
2 addition to the EEO-1 reporting was set to take effect for reporting years 2017
and 2018.218
However, with the change in presidential administration came changes at both
the OMB and the EEOC. In August 2017, the Trump Administration’s OMB
issued a stay of the collection of Component 2 data, claiming that it was
“concerned that some aspects of the revised collection of information lack
practical utility, are unnecessarily burdensome, and do not adequately address
privacy and confidentiality issues.”219 In response, the National Women’s Law
Center (“NWLC”) sued to enforce the properly enacted regulation, arguing that,
by imposing the stay, the “OMB . . . violated the PRA and Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) and exceeded their statutory authority.”220 The District
Court for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that the OMB’s justification
“rest[ed] on hyper-technical formatting changes that have no real consequences
for employers”221 and thus “provided inadequate reasoning to support its
decision to stay the data collection.”222 In March 2019, the District Court vacated
Id.
The twelve pay bands were $19,239 and under, $19,240 - $24,439, $24,440 - $30,679,
$30,680 - $38,999, $39,000 - $49,919, $49,920 - $62,919, $62,920 - $80,079, $80,080 $101,919, $101,920 - $128,959, $128,960 - $163,799, $163,800 - $207,999, and $208,000
and over. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, COMPONENT 2 EEO-1 ONLINE FILING SYSTEM SAMPLE
FORM 1, https://www.foley.com/-/media/files/firm/comp2eeo1onlinefilingsampleform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MF9-A7UF] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
217 Id.; see also Jeffery S. Kopp, Very Important Time-Sensitive New Requirements for
EEO-1 Component 2 Filings, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (July 26, 2019), https://www.foley.com
/en/insights/publications/2019/07/very-important-time-sensitive-eeo1-component-2
[https://perma.cc/9ESN-REG4].
218 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC to Collect Summary Pay Data (Sep. 29, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-collect-summary-pay-data [https://perma.cc/7LTPSP5E].
219 Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d 66, 74-75 (D.D.C.
2019) (citing Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Adm’r, Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., to Victoria
Lipnic, Acting Chair, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017)).
220 Id. at 76.
221 Id. at 92.
222 Id. at 90.
215
216
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the OMB’s stay of the enacted regulation.223 In a subsequent order on April 25,
2019 granting injunctive relief, the court held “that EEOC must immediately
take all steps necessary to complete the EEO-1 Component 2 data collections
for calendar years 2017 and 2018 by September 30, 2019”224—a task not
“deemed complete . . . until the percentage of EEO-1 reporters that have
submitted their EEO-1 Component 2 reports equals or exceeds the mean
percentage of EEO-1 reporters that . . . submitted EEO-1 reports in each of the
past four reporting years.”225
The Trump Administration appealed226 but also, in July 2019, began
collecting 2017 and 2018 Component 2 data per the court order,227 hiring the
National Opinion Research Center (“NORC”) at the University of Chicago to
help do so.228 Yet the victory was short lived. In September 2019, the EEOC
announced that it would not extend Component 2 data collection past the two
years of data covered by the 2016 regulation, and it sought renewal of collection
of Component 1 data only.229 As it had in its defense against the NWLC lawsuit,
the Administration cited costs, stating that, in March 2019, new data staff at the
EEOC “re-examined the methodology used to calculate the . . . burden for the
collection of EEO–1 data” and concluded that the 2016 EEOC staff
underestimated the cost significantly.230 Moreover, in November 2019, the
Id. at 93.
Order at 1, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 66 (No. 17-cv-2458) [hereinafter
Apr. 2019 Order].
225 Id. at 2; see also Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for
OMB Review, Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–
1), 81 Fed. Reg. 45,479, 45,483-89 (July 14, 2016).
226 Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, No. 19-5130, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18144 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 2020). The appeal was granted in part and dismissed as moot
based on the parties agreement that the government “substantially complied with the district
court’s post-judgment orders.” Id.
227 Reinstatement of Revised EEO–1: Pay Data Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,383 (May 1,
2019); see also Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Employers Must Submit EEO-1 Pay Data by Sept. 30,
SHRM (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance
/employment-law/pages/eeo-1-report-hearing.aspx [https://perma.cc/E96Q-ZNYC].
228 Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Opens Calendar Years 2017 and 2018 Pay Data
Collection (July 15, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-opens-calendar-years2017-and-2018-pay-data-collection [https://perma.cc/KNT5-RXLS].
229 Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,138,
48,138 (Sept. 12, 2019).
230 Id. at 48,138-40. These were shockingly different figures, with the Obama EEOC
estimating $54 million total in costs to business for data collection for 2017 and 2018
combined, and the Trump EEOC estimating $614 million in 2017 and $622 million in 2018—
a difference of nearly $1.2 billion. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Publication
of the Notice of Information Collection Regarding the EEO-1., EEOC [hereinafter EEO-1
Collection Information], https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-eeocand-publication-notice-information-collection-regarding-eeo-1
[https://perma.cc/D5QZXQ8Z] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
223
224
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OFCCP announced that it would not collect EEO-1 Component 2 data from
federal contractors at all;231 because Executive Order 11,246—not Title VII—
provides the OFCCP with its EEO-1 authority, the OFCCP was not required to
comply with the court’s order.232
Then, on February 10, 2020, a mere seven months after first opening its portal
to collect EEO-1 Component 2 data, the Trump Administration went back to the
D.C. District Court to argue that it had met the terms of the court’s April 25,
2019 order.233 In a joint status report, the parties stated that 89.2% of all covered
private employers had submitted their Component 2 pay data for 2017 and
2018,234 thus meeting the condition for completion that the court had set to meet
their duties under the reinstated 2016 regulation.235 This condition satisfied, the
court granted the order holding that the collection was complete.236 Immediately
the EEOC announced that it would be ending Component 2 data collection and
shutting down the portal within a matter of days.237
As this history shows, the mechanism to create and enforce a mandatory paydata reporting requirement in U.S. federal law already exists and can be utilized.
Indeed, the state law recently enacted in California was explicitly modeled on
the federal effort to collect EEO-1 Component 2 data,238 meaning that all
covered employers in California will already have to compile this information
starting in March 2021. And despite the Trump Administration’s arguments to
the contrary, 90% of the 60,000 covered employers nationwide were able to
comply despite any anticipated costs in as little as seven months.239 As one
attorney for the plaintiffs said, “The [Trump] administration said it was too
burdensome for employers to collect equal pay data, and we proved them
wrong.”240 At a minimum, the data collection already established under
231 Intention Not to Request, Accept, or Use Employer Information Report (EEO–1)
Component 2 Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,932, 64,933 (Nov. 25, 2019); see also Wolf, supra note
204.
232 Wolf, supra note 204.
233 Apr. 2019 Order, supra note 224.
234 Joint Status Report at 1, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F.
Supp. 3d 66 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 17-cv-02458).
235 Apr. 2019 Order, supra note 224, at 1-2; see also Adam Lidgett, Judge Accepts EEOC
Request to Close Out Pay Data Survey, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2020, 6:56 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1242409/judge-accepts-eeoc-request-to-close-out-paydata-survey.
236 Feb. 2020 Order at 2, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 66 (No. 17-cv-02458).
237 2019 Component 1 EEO-1 Survey, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/2019component-1-eeo-1-survey [https://perma.cc/8V8S-MU7J] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
238 S.B. 973, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(d)-(e) (Cal. 2020) (discussing the Obama
Administration’s EEO-1 expansion efforts, halted by the Trump Administration, and stating
that “[i]t is the intent of the [California] Legislature, in enacting this bill, to ensure that this
pay data will continue to be compiled and aggregated in California”).å
239 Lidgett, supra note 235.
240 Id. (alteration in original).
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expanded Component 2 of EEO-1 should continue beyond the initial three-year
requirement. Once the costs have been sunk and the processes established, there
is simply no valid reason to stop pay-data collection. Indeed, any costs from
startup would be amortized over a longer period of time, making it a better
proposition for business entities.
Should a new administration decide to reinstate the data collection for future
years, the next step would be to consider whether greater data collection or
publication would be warranted. The enforcement power of pay-data collection
could be expanded in three ways. First, collection could be expanded to smaller
employers—that is, those with fewer than 100 employees. While this would
expose potentially unfair pay disparities occurring at a significantly larger
number of U.S. employers, it is not without its costs. To require companies that
have never before filed an EEO-1 to do so would impose an administrative
burden on companies that may be less able to absorb the costs—a much greater
burden than requiring current EEO-1 filers to simply provide more types of
data.241 And the statistical significance of any conclusions drawn from pay
patterns by race or sex may be impacted by sample size where an employer has
fewer than 100 employees. Incrementally, then—and without seeing the effect
of new data collection efforts on larger employers—it may strike a better balance
not to extend mandatory EEO-1 data collection to smaller companies but to issue
guidelines for their voluntary tracking and compliance.
Second, EEO-1 filers could be required to provide greater analysis of their
own data. Notably, while the U.S. regulation requires collection and production
of raw data, some European data collection models, including the U.K. model,
require employers to actually calculate the gender pay gap in their own
institutions and provide a narrative report explaining their results.242 This would
likely enhance the behavior-forcing effects of existing disclosure requirements
by forcing employers to not only collect pay data but also actually confront the
situation in their workplace and analyze any causes of gender and racial
disparities.243 While doing so would impose additional costs on employers, it
could provide greater compliance and data for enforcement to the EEOC at no
additional public cost to the federal government. Importantly, any U.S. business
with employees in the United Kingdom is already required to produce this data
for their employees located there,244 posted on both the U.K. government’s and
the company’s own websites. For example, Google, Facebook, Bank of
America, American Airlines, and other large U.S businesses have already
compiled reports for their U.K. employees.245 Yet to require data in a meaningful
way that can be compared across companies, the EEOC would have to create
241
242
243
244
245

See supra Section IV.A.1.
See Overview, supra note 5.
See supra Section II.A.2.
UK Overview, supra note 171.
See Search and Compare Gender Pay Gap Data, supra note 171.
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and provide calculation instructions as the U.K. government has done. Also, the
U.K. requirement applies to employers of 250 or more, which are likely more
able to absorb the additional costs of the analysis.
Third, and likely the least costly and most powerful means for expanding
current EEO-1 requirements, would be to engage in greater public exposure of
the data already being collected. Current EEO-1 reporting is provided only to
the EEOC and is not published. With very little financial cost, the EEOC could
make these reports publicly available online, for example, by creating a
searchable database like that maintained in the United Kingdom. This would
immediately enhance both the ability to correct for information asymmetry and
the “publicness” values of pay-data disclosure,246 as current and future
employees, journalists, attorneys, and the public could all see the data the EEOC
receives.
Yet, while there would be little financial cost to this expansion, this would
require both a statutory change and a shift in employer expectations. A specific
subsection of Title VII requires the EEOC to keep its compliance data, including
EEO-1 forms, confidential; a violation of this provision is a criminal
misdemeanor.247 The EEOC may share EEO-1 information publicly—for
example, in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”)248—only after it institutes a “proceeding under Title VII involving the
EEO-1 data.”249 The statute “allow[s] the EEOC to publish only aggregated data,
and only in a manner that does not reveal any particular filer’s or any individual
employee’s personal information.”250 As discussed further in Part IV, there
would likely be significant opposition from the business community based on
privacy concerns. Indeed, in its initial efforts to expand EEO-1 data collection
to add Component 2 data, the Obama-era EEOC anticipated such concerns and
stated that all collected data on the expanded EEO-1 would remain
confidential.251
Again, evidence of pay or promotion gaps by gender or race do not prove
discrimination, as many legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (differences in

See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.3.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (prohibiting “any officer or employee of the Commission
[from] mak[ing] public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission
pursuant to its authority . . . prior to the institution of any proceeding under this subchapter
involving such information”); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 598 (1981); EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205.
248 See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
249 See EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205; accord Freedom of Information Act,
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/3EWG-7Z87] (last
visited Dec. 28, 2020).
250 EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205.
251 Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review,
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed.
Reg. 45,479, 45,491-92 (July 14, 2016); see also infra Section IV.B.
246
247
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qualifications, experience, seniority, and the like) could explain disparities. As
a result, publication of raw data without an explanatory analysis or narrative
could lead to misinterpretation by the public. Yet while such data does not prove
discrimination, it can help expose the structural causes of pay gaps, both at an
individual employer level and on a societal level. An employer who, after being
required to collect pay data, realizes that there are far more women in lower
paying roles may reflect upon its pay-setting and promotion procedures and
consider training and retention policies of lower-level employees. And a public
which sees that, across all employers, certain job categories are much more
heavily filled by racial minorities may gain the political will to tackle the causes
of workforce job segregation. Short of publishing individual employer data
under the U.K. model, the EEOC could publish more aggregated data by
industry or employer type as a first step in this process.
B.

Promotion Data to Break Through Glass Ceilings

Closely related to the problem of persistent gender and racial pay gaps is the
stall in progress to break through gender and racial glass ceilings. While many
U.S. workplaces have diverse workforces overall, women and racial minorities
are still significantly underrepresented in leadership positions within institutions
and industries. Recent statistics show that little progress has been made since the
enactment of Title VII in diversifying top leadership. For example, among
Fortune 500 companies, only 1% of CEOs are Black, 2% are Latinx, and 5% are
women.252 Additionally, women lead only 167 of the top 3,000 businesses, just
over 5.5%.253 Studies have also documented that those who do make it to CEO
face a “glass cliff” followed by a “savior effect”: women and racial minorities
are more likely to be promoted to CEO of weak performing firms and then
replaced by White men if their performance slips.254 Diversity is lacking not just
in top leadership positions but also in the middle and upper-middle levels of
leadership that pave the way to top positions. Among the Fortune 500, “[o]nly

252 Where’s the Diversity in Fortune 500 CEOs?, DIVERSITYINC (Oct. 8, 2012),
https://www.diversityinc.com/wheres-the-diversity-in-fortune-500-ceos/ [https://perma.cc
/NYU4-KBND]; see also Te-Ping Chen, Why Are There Still So Few Black CEOs?, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2020, 10:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-there-still-so-fewblack-ceos-11601302601 (noting that Black professionals make up only 1% of executive
positions in the top 500 companies, with Black women having least representation).
253 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Are All the Women CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:34
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-so-few-ceos-are-women-you-can-have-a-seat-atthe-table-and-not-be-a-player-11581003276.
254 See generally Alison Cook & Christy Glass, Above the Glass Ceiling: When Are
Women and Racial/Ethnic Minorities Promoted to CEO?, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1080,
1081-82 (2014).
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22 percent of senior vice presidents are women . . . [and w]omen are 18 percent
less likely to be promoted to manager than their male peers.”255
Outside of the business sector, these patterns remain consistent, particularly
in other traditionally white-collar, higher-paying fields. For example, despite
earning 59% of all master’s degrees—and many professional degrees, such as
48.5% in law and 47.5% in medicine—and despite holding nearly 52% of all
managerial and professional jobs, women hold only about 10-20% of leadership
positions, such as law firm equity partnerships, medical school deanships, or
senior management positions in S&P 1500 companies.256 Statistics also show a
profound racial glass ceiling—only three of the Fortune 500 CEOs are Black,257
and corporate leadership remains even less diverse than corporate board
membership.258 This doubly impacts women of color, who compose more than
18% of the U.S. workforce and employees of S&P 500 companies, yet hold just
4.7% of senior management positions in the S&P 500 and 0.4% (two) of CEO
positions in the Fortune 500.259
While statistics alone do not prove discrimination, the repeated patterns of
statistical overrepresentation by women and racial minorities in lower-level
positions and underrepresentation in higher-level positions demonstrate
systemic problems that remain nearly sixty years after Title VII was passed. As
with pay data, requiring employers to track and analyze their own patterns of
promotion and leadership can help identify structural causes of such disparities,
whether due to, for example, lack of training or mentoring opportunities, flawed
systems for assigning work or making promotion decisions, or the operation of
unexamined bias.

255 Claire Cain Miller, The Number of Women at the Top Is Falling, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2018, at BU4; see also Sarah Coury, Jess Huang, Ankur Kumar, Sara Prince, Alexis
Krivkovich & Lareina Yee, Women in the Workplace 2020, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 30,
2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/gender-equality/women-in-theworkplace-2019# [https://perma.cc/4GFC-K8RW].
256 Judith Warner, Nora Ellmann & Diana Boesch, The Women’s Leadership Gap:
Women’s Leadership by the Numbers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018, 9:04 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2018/11/20/461273/womensleadership-gap-2/ [https://perma.cc/QQV3-XXB5].
257 Ellen McGirt, Commentary, raceAhead: Only Three Black CEOs in the Fortune 500,
FORTUNE (Mar. 1, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/03/01/raceahead-three-blackceos/.
258 Susan E. Reed, Corporate Boards Are Diversifying. The C-Suite Isn’t., WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 2019, at B2.
259 Warner, Ellmann & Boesch, supra note 256.
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Current Comparative Examples

As with collection of pay data, and inspired by a lack of women and people
of color in leadership positions throughout the world,260 international and U.S.
state-level public policies provide models for tracking gender and racial
diversity in leadership upon which U.S. federal law could be based. Again,
existing efforts range from a light to a strong touch, with some governments
inferring leadership data from pay scale data, others requiring disclosures on
corporate leadership, and some mandating diversity from firms, for example, in
their board membership.261
On the lighter touch side of the spectrum, the United Kingdom’s pay-data
disclosures provide data by pay-band ranges that can be used to infer data about
diversity in organizational leadership.262 For example, in its 2018 disclosures to
comply with the U.K. pay-data directive, Google was forced to report the gender
makeup of employees in each of four quartiles of earnings.263 The pay-gap
disclosure showed a lack of gender diversity in leadership and promotional
opportunities.264 Further, over half of Google’s lowest-paid employees were
women, and the proportion of women in each quartile of earnings steadily
declined as pay rose: women were 51% of employees in the lowest-paid quartile,
38% of the lower middle, 24% of the upper middle, and only 21% of the
highest.265
Because U.K. law requires a narrative analysis to accompany the report,
Google itself recognized the possibility of a gender glass ceiling in its
operations, noting that, while it had “no statistically significant pay
differences . . . based on gender, when accounting for role, performance and
other factors,” its roughly 20% pay gap between men and women “is driven by
a representation gap”266 in higher paid positions. As the report explained,
The underrepresentation of women in senior leadership and engineering
roles is a global and long term challenge, and we are committed to
addressing this. The data for this report reflects representation as of April

260 See, e.g., The Glass-Ceiling Index: The Latest Data Suggest Progress for Women at
Work Has Stalled, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.economist.com/graphicdetail/2019/03/08/the-glass-ceiling-index.
261
See supra Section III.A.1.
262 See Paulina Pielichata, U.K. Disclosure Reports Put Spotlight on Compensation,
PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article
/20180430/PRINT/180439997/u-k-disclosure-reports-put-spotlight-on-compensation
[https://perma.cc/4ZNU-WVL2]; see also supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
263 See
GOOGLE,
GOOGLE
UK:
GENDER
PAY
REPORT
2
(2018),
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/diversity.google/en//static/pdf/Google_UK_2018
_Gender_Pay_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCK6-C9TX].
264 Id. at 1.
265 Id. at 2.
266 Id. at 1.
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2018. Since then, we’ve added dedicated staffing teams to focus on senior
engagement and hiring, as well as launched inclusive hiring guidelines to
support those involved in the process.
....
And because we know that hiring alone isn’t enough, we’ve launched
new retention initiatives, including a sponsorship programme that pairs
high-potential women directors with vice presidents who provide coaching
and advocacy to advance their careers.
....
Over the past year, we’ve begun sharing ownership for our diversity,
equity, and inclusion goals with our most senior leaders in order to
accelerate progress.267
Google’s reaction demonstrates that simply collecting pay data by quartile is
enough to provide information on demographics in leadership and to inspire
greater efforts toward promotion of diverse candidates.
Relatedly, other countries have taken a much stronger approach to
diversifying corporate boards. Since 2002, when Norway became the first, at
least fifteen countries have enacted laws requiring specific diverse membership
on boards of publicly traded corporations.268 These so-called “gender quota”
laws range from requiring one female board member, like in the UAE and India,
to a full 50% female membership, like in Israel, Greenland, and Quebec, with
most countries in the 30-40% range.269 Consequences for failing to comply range
from none to fees; denial of public contracts; refusal to register the board; or
even, as in Norway, dissolving the company.270
At the U.S. state level, one state, California, enacted a similar law in 2018,
which it expanded in 2020. The Act requires all publicly held corporations
“whose principal executive offices . . . are located in California”271 to have a
minimum of one female member of its board of directors by the end of 2019; by
the end of 2021, boards of five or more members must raise this to two and six
or more members to three female directors.272 Corporations that fail to comply
may be fined $100,000 for a first violation and $300,000 for any subsequent
Id. at 2-3.
See Siri Terjesen & Ruth Sealy, Board Gender Quotas: Exploring Ethical Tensions
from a Multi-Theoretical Perspective, 26 BUS. ETHICS Q. 23, 39 (2016); Siri Terjesen, Ruth
V. Aguilera & Ruth Lorenz, Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors
Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 233, 235 (2015).
269 Terjesen & Sealy, supra note 268, at 26.
270 Id. at 39, 65.
271 CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(a) (West 2020) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021).
272 Id. § 301.3(f) (defining “Female” as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a
woman, without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth,” and defining “[p]ublicly
held corporation” as “a corporation with outstanding shares listed on a major United States
stock exchange”).
267
268
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violation.273 Interestingly, the requirement is coupled with public disclosure by
the California Secretary of State, who “shall publish a report on its Internet Web
site” detailing the number of corporations covered, the number in compliance,
and the number that either moved in or out of compliance or went private.274 In
2020, California expanded the law to require that, by 2022, corporations have
between one and three directors, depending on total board size, “from an
underrepresented community,” defined as “an individual who self-identifies as
Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native
American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Native, or . . . as gay, lesbian, bisexual,
or transgender.”275
Mandating board diversity is not the same as mandating diverse employee
promotions, which would violate Title VII.276 Mandating board diversity also
does not necessarily translate to leadership diversity: one study of the richest
100 companies showed that the ten with the most diverse corporate boards (45%
to 69% of members were women and/or racial minorities) had far less diverse
executive-level employees (only 16% to 46%).277 The remaining ninety firms—
90% of the companies in the study—had fewer than 16% of executives who were
women and/or racial minorities.278 While studies document a correlation
between more diverse corporate board membership and more diverse hiring
overall,279 tracking data on those holding corporate management positions
would be a more direct approach to overcoming gender and racial glass ceilings.
Lastly, in a similar vein, a 2014 European Union (“EU”) directive that applies
to the EU’s twenty-seven member nations required publicly held corporations to
disclose nonfinancial information on a variety of social, labor, and
environmental topics, including “treatment of employees” and “diversity on
company boards (in terms of age, gender, educational and professional
background).”280 Similar to U.S. securities regulation, this directive applies to

Id. § 301.3(e)(1).
Id. § 301.3(c).
275 A.B. 979, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2020).
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e; United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that racial affirmative action plan in employment was
permissible because it did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees,”
and “the plan [was] a temporary measure . . . to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance”); see
also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640-42 (1987) (holding that voluntary genderbased affirmative action programs are within ambit of Title VII and allowed because they are
not absolute bar to male advancement).
277 Reed, supra note 258.
278 Id.
279 See id.
280 Non-Financial Reporting, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economyeuro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en
[https://perma.cc/LZW9-B6JX] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also Directive 2014/95, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Oct. 2014 on Amending Directive 2013/34
273
274
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large publicly held corporations based in the EU. And while the directive
requires disclosure of any diversity policy, it does not require one to be created,
so long as an explanation is provided.281
2.

Requiring Diversity-of-Leadership Disclosures in U.S. Law

As with pay data, imposing a federal mandatory-public-disclosure
requirement on gender and racial makeup of leadership would be an incremental
change, building upon structures that already exist. As described previously, at
the U.S. federal level, existing EEO-1 requirements mandate that employers of
100 or more and federal contractors of fifty or more provide racial and gender
data on their workers in ten different job categories.282 The job category for
officials and managers is subdivided into executive/senior and first/midlevel.283
While it lasted, Component 2 data added twelve pay bands within each of these
categories.284
In addition, while no U.S. federal law requires corporate board diversity,
federal securities law has begun to consider diversity measures. In 2009, the
SEC added a requirement that covered entities disclose “whether, and if so how,
a nominating committee considers diversity in identifying nominees for
director.”285 The SEC has recently interpreted this disclosure to include a
description of “the self-identified diversity characteristics . . . (e.g., race, gender,
ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or cultural
background)” considered in making a board appointment and the role those
characteristics played in the process.286
As with pay data, then, the easiest option at the federal level for expanding
data collection on race and gender inequality in leadership would be to reinstate
collection of Component 2 pay data, which would at least show pay quartile by
gender and race. Propensity to be promoted across racial and gender lines can
as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large
Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) ¶¶ 18-19.
281 Directive 2014/95, supra note 280, ¶ 19 (“The obligation to disclose diversity policies
in relation to the administrative, management and supervisory bodies with regard to aspects
such as, for instance, age, gender or educational and professional backgrounds should apply
only to certain large undertakings. Disclosure of the diversity policy should be part of the
corporate governance statement . . . . If no diversity policy is applied there should not be any
obligation to put one in place, but the corporate governance statement should include a clear
explanation as to why this is the case.”).
282 See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
283 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
285 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334,
68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009).
286 Regulation S-K: Questions and Answers of General Applicability, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6T9S5LA] (last updated Sept. 21, 2020).
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be inferred from this information. It is possible that the combination of these two
items could paint a useful picture of glass ceiling effects by race and gender. In
the future, even more specific information could be added to the EEO-1 form—
for example, a column identifying the leadership roles within each of the ten job
categories. But, this would require another revision to the EEO-1. These changes
would have to be designed to avoid redundancy, as two of the ten job categories
encompass managers and officers already.287 Another option would be to expand
financial disclosure requirements on these topics to the SEC, but, for reasons
discussed in Section III.C below, the EEOC is better equipped to use the
collected data to recognize race and gender inequality that may be
discriminatory.
While California has gone so far as to mandate corporate board diversity, a
requirement of the sort would be unlikely at the federal level as anything
perceived to be a sex or race “quota” generally lacks legislative support.288
Indeed, the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of
State of California alleging that the 2018 law is unconstitutional sex
discrimination against men and seeking to enjoin the law from taking effect.289
Harassment Settlements to Expose and Change Cultures

C.

A final area in which U.S. antidiscrimination law efforts have stalled—as the
#MeToo movement has made clear—is redressing harassment. As described
previously, despite being illegal for decades, sexual harassment in the workplace
is still shockingly common and dramatically underreported,290 and racial
harassment charges to the EEOC have increased over the past decade.291
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
Notably, federal contractors are required to comply with affirmative action mandates
that encourage racial and gender diversity in hiring. Affirmative Action, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/hiring/affirmativeact
[https://perma.cc/PC7X-WJCL]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020). These have been long established by Executive Order and are
likely the cause of any pay and promotion equity among federal contractors. See Exec. Order
11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965). Such measures, however, do not extend to
private employers, for whom the law on affirmative action is different. A discussion of
affirmative action in hiring is beyond this Article’s scope.
289 The case was dismissed for lack of standing, a decision that the plaintiffs have appealed.
Meland v. Padilla, No. 2:19-cv-02288, 2020 WL 1911545, at *4 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2020),
appeal docketed, No. 20-15762 (9th Cir. April 23, 2020); see also Kayla Epstein, This State
Requires Company Boards to Include Women. A New Lawsuit Says That’s Unconstitutional.,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11
/14/this-state-requires-company-boards-include-women-new-lawsuit-says-thatsunconstitutional/.
290 See supra Sections I.C, II.B.
291 Charges Alleging Race and Harassment (Charges Filed With EEOC) FY 1997 - FY
2019,
EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race_harassment.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XT8M-RLQK] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (showing low of 5,600 charges
filed in 2005 and high of 9,656 charges filed in 2016).
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As this Article has established, because of the very nature of harassment,
victims are afraid to come forward to complain—a fear compounded by fear of
retaliation. And employers, fearing negative public exposure, are more likely to
force harassment claims into private arbitration or require a nondisclosure
agreement as part of a settlement. All of these factors—stigma, fear of
retaliation, and confidentiality—create a perfect storm of stagnation in rooting
out sexual harassment. While employers often view harassment as a “one bad
apple” individual problem, the structural components that allow for a culture of
harassment to persist remain unaddressed. For all of these reasons, public
disclosure requirements may have the greatest effect in documenting harassment
claims that end in settlement or arbitration.
1.

Current Comparative Examples

While less common than pay data and diversity reporting requirements, a
handful of international and state models for harassment disclosures exist, again
providing a variety of approaches from which U.S. federal law could draw.
Whereas the United States operates under a common-law system, many EU
member nations are civil-law systems (for example, Germany, France, and
Spain), in which the judge plays a larger investigatory role, and government
agencies do more to resolve cases, which reduces the volume of private
litigation.292 In the United Kingdom, the relevant equality commission has the
power to investigate and order employer compliance itself.293 Thus the need for
reporting confidential settlements in the EU and the United Kingdom may be far
less than the need in the United States.
There is no comprehensive EU directive on this topic, but some individual
nations have developed their own reporting schemes. For example, government
entities in both Sweden and Northern Ireland make public any discrimination
settlements, including harassment settlements, in which the equality body is
involved.294 In Northern Ireland, the Equality Commission maintains a public
See ISABELLE CHOPIN & CATHARINA GERMAINE, EUR. COMM’N, A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN EUROPE 84-94, 103-08 (2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49316
[https://perma.cc/WGX6-GVB8].
293 Id. at 105 (“In the United Kingdom, both the British Equality and Human Rights
Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland are able to use their powers
of formal investigation to investigate organisations they believe to be discriminating and,
where they are satisfied that unlawful acts have been committed, they can serve a binding
‘compliance notice’ requiring the organisation to stop discriminating and to take action by
specified dates to prevent discrimination from recurring. They also have the power to enter
into (and to enforce via legal action if necessary) binding agreements with other bodies that
undertake to avoid discriminatory acts and to seek an injunction to prevent someone
committing an unlawful discriminatory act.” (emphasis omitted)).
294 Alysia Blackham & Dominique Allen, Lifting the Curtain on Equality Law: The
Emerging Importance of Transparency in Promoting Equality 7-8 (June 17, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) (citing
292
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database of cases and settlements.295 The United Kingdom has begun to work
toward legislation that would set limitations on confidentiality clauses in
settlement agreements that seek to prevent disclosure of harassment and
discrimination.296
In the United States, at least fifteen states have enacted laws to ban or limit
nondisclosure agreements of harassment claims.297 For example, California’s
law, enacted in 2018, prohibits any “provision within a settlement agreement
that prevents the disclosure of factual information” related to a civil claim or
administrative complaint involving sexual assault or sexual harassment,
“workplace harassment or discrimination based on sex” or a “failure to prevent”
it, or “an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or
discrimination based on sex.”298 In addition, seven states have passed laws

RIKSDAGSORDNINGEN [RO] [CONSTITUTION] (Swed.)) (noting that in Sweden, this is a product
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to information from government bodies); see also
Alysia Blackham, Positive Equality Duties: The Future of Equality and Transparency?, LAW
IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Boston University Law Review).
295 Id. at 8; see also Case Decisions & Settlements, EQUAL. COMM. FOR N. IR.,
https://www.equalityni.org/cases [https://perma.cc/32LV-ZBVS] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020)
(containing database of cases).
296 Dominique Allen & Alysia Blackham, Under Wraps: Secrecy, Confidentiality and the
Enforcement of Equality Law in Australia and the United Kingdom, 43 MELBOURNE UNIV. L.
REV. 384, 419-21 (2019). See generally WOMEN & EQUALITIES COMMITTEE, THE USE OF NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS IN DISCRIMINATION CASES: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
COMMITTEE’S NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2017–19, 2019, HC 215 (UK); DEP’T FOR BUS.,
ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES: RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT
CONSULTATION ON PROPOSALS TO PREVENT MISUSE IN SITUATIONS OF WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT OR DISCRIMINATION. (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/818324/confidentiality-clauseconsultation-govt-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NF-C9TY].
297 ANDREA JOHNSON, RAMYA SEKARAN & SASHA GOMBAR, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.,
2020 PROGRESS UPDATE: METOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN THE STATES 8-10 (2020),
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/v1_2020_nwlc2020States_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SVE-VELL] (describing such laws in Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington); Gena B. Usenheimer, Anne R. Dana, & Vlada Feldman,
#MeToo Inspires Legislative Changes Across the United States, SEYFARTH (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/metoo-inspires-legislative-changes-across-theunited-states.html [https://perma.cc/FS5Y-B6TK] (describing such laws in California, New
Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington); see also Elizabeth C. Tippett, The
Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 249-58 (2018).
298 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2020). Then-Governor Jerry Brown, citing
Supreme Court precedent, vetoed a related measure that would have prohibited applicants or
employees from being forced to waive their right to litigate discrimination charges as a
condition of employment or continued employment. See A.B. 3080, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2018); AB-3080 Employment Discrimination: Enforcement, CA. LEGIS. INFO.
(2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201720180AB3080 [https://perma.cc/45QQ-NV8P] (providing status of bill and containing
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limiting mandatory predispute arbitration agreements that include sexual
harassment claims, although several are being challenged in federal court as
violating the Federal Arbitration Act.299
Two states have gone further, enacting affirmative reporting requirements of
confidential settlements to a government agency. In 2018, as part of reforms to
better redress sexual harassment, Maryland enacted a law that requires
employers to disclose settlements of sexual harassment claims to its state fair
employment agency.300 The law requires employers of fifty or more employees
to submit a survey to the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”) two
separate times, on or before July 1, 2020 and July 1, 2022, when the provision
sunsets.301 In the survey, the employer must report the number of settlements it
has made to resolve a sexual harassment allegation, the number of times it paid
a settlement against the same employee perpetrator in the prior ten years, and
the number of such settlements that included a confidentiality provision.302
Employers are allowed to detail in the survey any “personnel action” it took
against the perpetrator employee.303 The law establishes that the MCCR “shall
publish and make accessible to the public . . . on the Commission’s website”
aggregate responses to the survey and create a report based on a random
selection of surveys for the Governor “redacting any identifying information for
specific employers.”304 However, the MCCR will also retain individual
employer responses and make parts of them subject to public inspection upon
request.305
Likewise, in 2019, Illinois enacted a significant package of legislation to
update and strengthen its laws against sexual harassment, including a settlement
reporting requirement.306 Illinois’s disclosure requirements are even more
comprehensive, including all discrimination claims. Starting July 1, 2020,
employers of one or more must disclose to the Illinois Department of Human
Rights (“IDHR”) on an annual basis any “adverse judgment or administrative
ruling” in which there was a finding of unlawful discrimination, including sexual

Governor’s veto message that “[t]his bill is based on a theory that the Act only governs the
enforcement and not the initial formation of arbitration agreements and therefore California
is free to prevent mandatory arbitration agreements from being formed at the outset. The
Supreme Court has made it explicit this approach is impermissible”).
299 JOHNSON, SEKARAN & GOMBAR, supra note 298, at 11-12 (describing such laws in
California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Washington, and legal
challenges to the California, New Jersey, and New York laws).
300 See H.B. 1596, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); S.B. 1010, Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018).
301 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.
302 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.
303 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.
304 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.
305 Md. H.B. 1596; Md. S.B. 1010.
306 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-108 (2020).
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harassment.307 The report must include the total number of adverse rulings under
federal, state, or local law; any equitable relief that was ordered; and whether
the claims involve sexual harassment or involve other discrimination on the
basis of protected class.308 The Act also allows IDHR investigators to request
and receive information on past settlements in the course of an investigation and
requires the IDHR to publish an annual aggregated report without identification
of any particular employer, the filings of which are confidential and not subject
to FOIA laws.309
2.

Requiring Harassment-Settlement Disclosures in U.S. Law

At the federal level, while it is not as directly applicable as the EEO-1 is to
pay and promotion data collection, the federal government collects some data
on harassment in the context of federally funded education. Under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972,310 all public and private educational
institutions that receive federal funding must enforce prohibitions against sex
discrimination, including sexual harassment and assault.311 In addition, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964312 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973313 require schools to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, and disability. Federal laws and regulations authorize the
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights “to collect data that are
necessary to ensure compliance with civil rights laws within [its]
jurisdiction.”314 Since 1968, as part of this process, covered programs from early

Id. 5/2-108(B).
Id. Protected class bases tracked include sex; race, color, or national origin; religion;
age; disability; military status; sexual orientation or gender identity; or other. Id. § 2108(B)(3).
309 Id. 5/2-108(C)-(E).
310 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
311 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2020)
312 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
313 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
314 20 U.S.C. § 3413(c)(1); accord 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2019); id. § 104.61 (adopting
procedural provisions applicable to Title VI to implement Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
of 1973); id. § 106.71 (adopting procedural provisions applicable to Title VI to implement
Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972); Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC):
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list
/ocr/frontpage/faq/crdc.html#crdc [https://perma.cc /LM4E-T9CK] (last updated Jan. 10,
2020) (“[The Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”)]’s implementing regulations for each of these
statutes require recipients of the Department’s federal financial assistance to submit to OCR
‘complete and accurate compliance reports at such times, and in such form and containing
such information’ as OCR ‘may determine to be necessary to enable [OCR] to ascertain
whether the recipient has complied or is complying’ with these laws and implementing
regulations.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b))).
307
308
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education through the twelfth grade must complete the Civil Rights Data
Collection survey every two years.315 The survey includes a requirement that
each entity report on incidents of “harassment or bullying” on the basis of sex,
race, color, national origin, or disability—including data on reported allegations,
students who were victims, and students who were disciplined as perpetrators.316
Data are published in a searchable database online.317
In addition, under the Clery Act amendment to the Higher Education Act of
1965, colleges and universities that receive federal funds must collect and
produce data reports annually on campus crime, including sexual assault,
domestic or dating violence, stalking, and crimes “in which the victim is
intentionally selected because of the actual or perceived race, gender, religion,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, ethnicity, or disability of the
victim.”318 Covered entities must collect and disseminate reports on crime
statistics to their local communities and provide the report annually to the
Secretary of Education.319
In the past two legislative sessions, federal legislators have introduced bills in
both chambers to expand reporting requirements under the Clery Act but without
success to date. Both bills would require the Department of Education or the
institutions themselves to publish online standardized, confidential, campuslevel results of periodic surveys of students on intimate partner violence, sexual
assault, stalking, and/or sexual harassment to allow “students [to] make an
informed choice when comparing universities.”320 They would also require the
Department to “publish the names of all schools with pending investigations,
final resolutions, and voluntary resolution agreements related to Title IX with
respect to sexual violence.”321
Other legislation proposed that the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and the EEOC develop and conduct a “national prevalence survey on

Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC): Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 314.
OFFICE FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2017-18 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: LIST
OF CRDC DATA ELEMENTS FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2017–18, at 3 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2017-18-crdc-data-elements.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYE5-E3V8].
317 Civil
Rights Data Collection, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://ocrdata.ed.gov/
[https://perma.cc/SVG7-TNWC] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
318 Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(ii) (footnote omitted).
319 Id. § 1092(f)(3), (5).
320 The
Campus Accountability and Safety Act, KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND,
https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/campus-sexual-assault
[https://perma.cc/P8QE-Y43P]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020); see also HALT Campus Sexual Violence Act, H.R. 3381, 116th
Cong. § 5 (2019) (requiring Department of Education to develop biennial sexual violence
climate survey and requiring institutions to publish results online).
321 The Campus Accountability and Safety Act, supra note 320; accord H.R. 3381, § 2
(requiring Department of Education to publish online list of institutions under investigation
and any sanctions, findings, or resolution agreements related to same).
315
316
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the prevalence of prohibited harassment in employment” every three years to
assess “beliefs, attitudes, and understanding of prohibited harassment in
employment, and the extent to which such harassment is experienced or
observed” in U.S. workplaces.322 The data would be disaggregated by protected
class, subtypes of sex-based harassment, and “industry and salary level,
including across all wage bands.”323 These bureaus and the EEOC would then
“jointly prepare and submit . . . a report on the results of that survey” to
Congress, and the report “shall [also] be made publicly available on the [three
agencies’] websites.”324
A number of legal scholars have also proposed,325 and federal legislators have
introduced, bills that would limit or bar nondisclosure agreements or
confidential settlements that include sexual harassment claims or discrimination
claims on the basis of any protected class.326 Scholars have also argued in favor
of barring mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims,327 and federal
legislators proposed several bills that would do so as well.328 In lieu of
legislation, legal scholars David Hoffman and Erik Lampmann have argued that

322

BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 111(a)-(b) (2019).
Id. § 111(c)(2)(B).
324 Id. § 111(c)(1), (c)(4).
325 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 47-48 (2018) (“Federal and state
law should restrict the use in standard employment contracts of broad nondisclosure
agreements . . . in the context of settling an employee’s legal claims, enforcing them only
where they meet certain requirements designed to permit disclosure of serial harassment or
discrimination.”); Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76,
79 (2018) (suggesting that some nondisclosure agreements should be subject to conditions
and escrow requirements); Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in
Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 349-50 (2018) (arguing
that limits on confidential agreements may encourage reporting and help reveal patterns of
wrongdoing); Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needsto-change (“[E]fforts to ban secret settlements in the case of sexual harassment claims should
be welcomed.”).
326 H.R. 2148, § 302 (prohibiting employers from entering into contracts or agreements
with workers that contain certain nondisparagement or nondisclosure clauses); EMPOWER
Act, H.R. 1521, 116th Cong. § 103 (2019) (prohibiting inclusion in employment contracts of
nondisparagement or nondisclosure clauses that cover workplace harassment based on any
protected class, unless mutually agreed upon and beneficial to both employer and employee).
327 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 325, at 47; Erik Encarnacion, Discrimination, Mandatory
Arbitration, and Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 855, 899-904 (2020).
328 See, e.g., H.R. 2148, § 303 (prohibiting predispute but allowing postdispute arbitration
agreement if employee enters into it voluntarily without coercion and is informed in writing
of rights and protections); Restoring Justice for Workers Act, S. 1491, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019)
(same); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2019, H.R. 1443, 116th
Cong. § 2 (2019) (prohibiting predispute arbitration agreements that require arbitration of sex
discrimination disputes).
323
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nondisclosure agreements that ban disclosure of sexual misconduct should be
void under contract law as a violation of public policy.329
Short of banning nondisclosure agreements entirely and moving closer to a
public agency disclosure model, Ian Ayres has proposed that, if certain
nondisclosure agreements are to be allowed, they should involve EEOC
oversight.330 To be enforceable, Ayres suggests, a nondisclosure agreement must
“explicitly describe the rights which the [employee] retains . . . to report the
perpetrator’s behavior to the [EEOC],” it must require the perpetrator not to
misrepresent any “past interactions” with the employee, and the employee’s
allegations must be “deposited in an information escrow that would be released
for investigation by the EEOC if another complaint is received against the same
perpetrator.”331
In a similar vein, Samuel Estreicher has proposed that the EEOC require
employers to provide information on settlements with perpetrator identities
protected so that, should a “pattern of repeated settlements emerge[],” the
agency could intervene and investigate without the need for the employee to file
a formal charge with the agency.332 If the EEOC decides to pursue the claim, it
could then “obtain discovery of all claims of abuse involving the particular
employee,” now seeking injunctive relief and substantial damages.333 (In
contrast, Ayres’s proposals would allow identities to be released automatically
for repeat offenders.334) Settlement information could be obtained, Estreicher
suggests, through a simple add-on to data the EEOC already compels under its
existing Title VII authority to collect reports like the EEO-1.335 This could be a
“one-liner” addition to existing reports that avoids the Paperwork Reduction Act
challenges faced by Component 2 pay data reporting given how quickly an

329 See generally David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U.
L. REV. 165 (2019).
330
Ayres, supra note 325, at 79.
331 Id.; see also Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145,
147 (2012).
332 See Samuel Estreicher, Opinion, How to Stop the Next Harvey Weinstein, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 12, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-11-12/howto-stop-the-next-harvey-weinstein; see also Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87 (describing
Estreicher’s proposal and noting that “survivors, notwithstanding any settlement or
[nondisclosure agreement], always remain free to cooperate with an EEOC investigation”).
333 Estreicher, supra note 332.
334 Ayres, supra note 325, at 87.
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.11 (2020).
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employer could complete it.336 The EEOC could then monitor and intervene
using its investigatory power for repeat offenders.337
In 2019, U.S. Representative Carolyn Maloney proposed a similar idea in the
Ending Secrecy About Workplace Sexual Harassment Act338—the most directly
in line with a model compelling disclosure to the EEOC. The bill would require
every EEO-1-covered employer to include in its annual EEO-1 report “the
number of settlements reached by the employer” that year to resolve sex
discrimination complaints, including sexual harassment, “where anything of
value is conferred to the individual raising the claim in return for such individual
declining to further pursue the claim, any internal mediation or other workplace
resolution that results in the individual declining to further pursue the claim.”339
It would also order the EEOC to report this data, as well as data on its own
received charges of sex discrimination and resolution of those cases, to Congress
annually340 and would order the U.S. Comptroller General to “conduct a
comprehensive study of claims of discrimination on the basis of sex,
including . . . sexual harassment” and report to Congress the results of that study
with “recommendations for legislation or other action for improving
transparency and accountability regarding such claims.”341
Beyond data collection, labor law scholars Sharon Block and Terri Gerstein
have proposed requiring government agency notification or approval of any
private settlement of sexual harassment claims.342 They suggest that a court or
relevant antidiscrimination agency be required to sign off on such settlements,
pointing to similar requirements for settlements under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which requires “court approval or review by the federal labor department,”
and for settlements under the Class Action Fairness Act, which requires notice
to the state attorney general or alternative.343 Requiring approval, or even notice,
they argue, would “create a public record of settlements, giving workers access

336 NYU School of Law, Avoiding the Next Harvey Weinstein: Sexual Harassment & NonDisclosure
Agreements,
YOUTUBE, at
01:01:40-:02:15
(Feb.
8,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTw-w9gnjjM; see also Ayres, supra note 325, at 86
(describing Estreicher’s proposal).
337 Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87 (describing Estreicher’s proposal).
338
H.R. 1828, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
339 Id. § 2(a)-(b).
340 Id. § 4.
341 Id. § 5.
342 Sharon Block & Terri Gerstein, We Need an Agenda for New Laws to Prevent Sexual
Harassment, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2017/dec/02/agenda-new-laws-prevent-sexual-harassment
[https://perma.cc/H2G2-TYDW]; Terri Gerstein, Sexual Harassment: New Laws that Would
Help, ONLABOR (Dec. 6, 2017), https://onlabor.org/sexual-harassment-new-laws-that-wouldhelp/ [https://perma.cc/2PMH-TAK8].
343 Gerstein, supra note 342 (citation omitted); accord Block & Gerstein, supra note 342.
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to important information and enabling the government to intervene when a clear
pattern has emerged.”344
Using a different reporting mechanism, securities law scholars and federal
legislators have considered whether SEC disclosure requirements could be used
to collect and publicize data on sexual harassment settlements. Daniel Hemel
and Dorothy Lund have considered using corporate law structures themselves as
a means of redressing sexual harassment, considering liability under federal
securities law disclosure requirements and state corporate law fiduciary
duties.345 With regard to disclosures, they review existing disclosure
requirements, ultimately concluding that under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Regulation S-K, and Rule 10b-5, “the argument that [they] mandate[]
disclosure of sexual harassment claims is . . . questionable at best.”346 They also
address the movement to encourage companies toward greater disclosure on
ESG factors,347 noting that “[s]exual harassment policies and procedures are
likely to be the next frontier” in this area.348
Lastly, federal legislators have also proposed expanding the SEC’s mandate
in both of the past two legislative sessions without success. One bill, the Sunlight
in Workplace Harassment Act, would have SEC-covered entities “disclose
annually on Form 10–K, to shareholders . . . and to the public . . . the total
number of settlements entered into” in the prior year by the entity and its
contractors, subsidiaries, or executives “that relate to any alleged act of sexual
abuse . . . harassment, or . . . discrimination” on the basis of any protected class,
including sex and race, as well as “the total dollar amount paid with respect to
[such] settlements.”349 In announcing their bill, the authors stressed the need for
exposure to motivate change, noting that requiring public disclosures would
“lead to greater transparency . . . and a more robust discussion of how to prevent
workplace misconduct and hold people in power accountable” and arguing that
“the amount of money that companies spend on [discrimination] settlements”
directly impacts the financial health of the company as an investment.350 A
second proposal included a similar provision that would require any entity filing

Block & Gerstein, supra note 342.
See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1590-92.
346 See id. at 1650-55.
347 Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan & Eva Zlotnicka,
The Business Case for ESG, STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES, May 23, 2019, at 1, 2 (analyzing
different approaches to incorporating ESG factors into the decision-making processes of
corporations).
348 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1663-66.
349 Sunlight in Workplace Harassment Act, S. 2454, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
350 Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator, U.S. Senate, Warren, Rosen Unveil
Bicameral Legislation to End Secrecy in Workplace Harassment Settlements (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-rosen-unveil-bicamerallegislation-to-end-secrecy-in-workplace-harassment-settlements
[https://perma.cc/FC3RVVLL].
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a Form 10-K to include the number of settlements during the reporting period
for workplace harassment on the basis of any protected class (including sex and
race) and for retaliation; the total amount of “any judgments or awards
(including awards through arbitration or administrative proceedings) . . . entered
against the [entity] . . . or any payments made in connection with a release of
claims.”351 The disclosure would also require notice of whether there were three
or more such settlements or judgments “that relate to a particular individual
employed . . . without identifying that individual by name.” 352
As these many ideas and legislative proposals demonstrate, there are many
approaches the federal government could take to compel employers to disclose
the existence of harassment in their ranks. Yet each varies in terms of its
feasibility of being enacted and how well it serves the theoretical goals of
compelled disclosure. Basic prohibitions of either nondisclosure agreements or
arbitration of harassment claims would do a great deal to help with private,
individual enforcement of sexual and racial harassment and discrimination
claims. Yet their focus on transparency and secrecy achieves only so much given
that they still rely on individual employees to speak out and to litigate publicly.
While they increase transparency, they still rely entirely on an employee to
overcome fear of stigma, retaliation, and loss of their own confidentiality to
make the settlement public. Even though the employer may no longer hide
behind confidentiality or unpublicized arbitrations, the employer bears no
additional cost or motivation to prevent the harassment unless the employee is
willing to risk retribution to attract publicity to the case.
Ayres’s and Estreicher’s proposals recognize that it may be impractical or
unwise to ban all confidential settlements (which employees may prefer) and
rightly engage the EEOC to pick up a greater role in the enforcement burden.353
They also allow a path for adopting a disclosure requirement administratively
rather than hoping for any piece of legislation to pass in the current polarized
political environment.354 Yet, in maintaining total confidentiality, neither
reaches the full potential of the information-asymmetry-correcting, behaviorforcing, and publicness benefits that undergird the power of compelled
disclosures.355 This means that the EEOC—and only the EEOC, with its limited
resources—must act to make a change. On the other hand, Block and Gerstein’s
proposal goes further toward harnessing the power of publicness, but it may go
too far in limiting settlement options that plaintiffs may want or need, and it
would require amending Title VII.356

351 Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace Harassment Through Education and
Reporting Act, H.R. 1521, 116th Cong. § 105(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2019).
352 Id. § 105(c)(2).
353 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332.
354 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332.
355 See Ayres, supra note 325, at 86-87; Estreicher, supra note 332.
356 See Block & Gerstein, supra note 342.
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Lastly, proposals to expand SEC disclosures are, not surprisingly, most
aligned with the benefits of public disclosure, in that they would be public and
identifiable and would truly compel employers to feel the economic pain of
losing stock value due to exposure of harassment. Indeed, as Hemel and Lund
suggest, the benefit of using securities law is that requiring public disclosures of
sexual harassment claims and settlements would not only arm applicants and
employees with information but “might encourage companies to do more to
prevent workplace sexual harassment to avoid having to make such disclosures
in the first place.”357
Yet the SEC may not be the right entity to collect this information. First,
disclosures to the SEC are only required of large, publicly traded companies—
at last count only about 3,600 firms358—compared to the over 60,000 entities
(employers of 100 or more and certain federal contractors) required to file EEO1 reports.359 This would greatly limit the reach and effectiveness of disclosure
requirements. More importantly, the SEC is not currently in a position to do
anything with that information other than make it public, whereas the EEOC can
track, investigate, issue reports, and more as part of its duty to enforce
antidiscrimination law protections. As Hemel and Lund identify, using the
mechanism of SEC disclosures might be criticized for diverting securities law
from “its principal objectives [of] maximizing shareholder value, protecting
investors, and promoting the efficient allocation of capital” (yet subject to
rebuttal that liability for “[w]orkplace-based sexual misconduct does reduce
shareholder value [and] harm investors”).360 Incorporating harassment
disclosures to the SEC might be just one piece of the larger project of increasing
SEC disclosure requirements to reach ESG issues—a move that, as discussed in
Part IV, has garnered some criticism.361 While helpful in creating public
exposure, the issue of harassment could get lost among a sea of priorities for
investor audiences, rather than being the priority among disclosures to the
EEOC. This could lead to what Hemel and Lund call the “discursive harm” of
“[o]veremphasizing the harm to shareholders and to markets,” thus treating a

Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1666-67.
Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, supra note 70.
359 See Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review,
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81 Fed. Reg.
45,479, 45,496 (July 14, 2016).
360 Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1668, 1671.
361 Id. at 1663-66. The topic of ESG is monumental and well beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally, e.g., Lipton, Mixed Company, supra note 83, at 82-84 (examining ways
that sustainability disclosures are relevant to corporate financial performance); Lipton, Not
Everything, supra note 83, at 527-33 (analyzing the impact of prosocial corporate behavior
on corporations).
357
358
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discrimination problem with seriously harmed victims as mere “negative
economic externalities.”362
Given all of the options, the most immediately and directly implementable
solution would likely be to require reporting to the EEOC as part of the EEO-1
or in a standalone requirement of confidential settlements or arbitration
decisions. At the very least, this would allow the EEOC to better track where
entities or industries experience repeated harassment or discrimination made
otherwise untrackable due to confidential resolutions (though if a charge is filed
before the settlement, the EEOC should have this information already). Even
better would be to allow the public access to such information, either upon
request as in the Maryland state model or posted publicly with other pay data,
should Title VII be amended to allow public disclosure. The SEC model shows
that we are willing to require public disclosure of many things that relate to the
profitability of a public company. If we are serious about stopping harassment,
we should not allow entities to hide its existence from other employees or the
public.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Article has made the case from both normative and theoretical
perspectives for mandatory public disclosures on equality measures, and it has
proposed a framework for imposing such requirements on employers under U.S.
federal law. Yet, as has been shown by similar efforts in other countries—and
by efforts to expand disclosure requirements under U.S. securities law—any
such proposal will face criticism. This Part raises and responds to likely
arguments against imposing mandatory disclosure requirements as part of
antidiscrimination law enforcement. It addresses economic and practical
counterarguments to requiring employers to provide equality disclosures, as well
as constitutional concerns rooted in privacy rights and the First Amendment.
While there are certainly challenges to consider, this Part concludes that the need
for greater antidiscrimination law enforcement and the benefits to be gained by
imposing the proposed disclosure requirements outweigh costs.
A.

The Case Against Disclosing Discrimination

This Section identifies and responds to the main economic and practical
arguments against imposing a mandatory disclosure regime on equality
measures. Criticisms of disclosure in the securities law context, business-centric
arguments against existing antidiscrimination law data collection, and

Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1671. That said, they also suggest that “the availability
of alternative mechanisms for addressing problems related to workplace sexual misconduct
does not make corporate law an irrelevant—or undesirable—tool in the fight against sexual
harassment,” suggesting that “various tools may be complements rather than substitutes.” Id.
at 1678.
362

2021]

DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION

349

scholarship on civil rights law compliance suggest three main counterarguments:
inefficiency, manipulability, and unintended consequences.
1.

Cost/Benefit Concerns and Disclosure Overload

The most likely practical concern with imposing new equality disclosure
requirements on U.S. businesses is that they are inefficient: producing such
information is costly to businesses and does not return enough benefits.363 While
a general argument against any regulatory burden, arguments that costs
outweigh benefits have been frequently raised in the context of securities
disclosure requirements.364 A related concern in the securities context is
“disclosure overload”—the idea that SEC-reporting entities are required to
produce so much information that what is produced becomes duplicative and
unreadable, losing its utility to investors.365 Such concerns sparked an SEC
initiative to simplify disclosures, which resulted in a new “Disclosure Update
and Simplification” regulatory rule, enacted in November 2018, to amend
disclosure requirements that had “become redundant, duplicative, overlapping,
outdated, or superseded.”366
As applied to antidiscrimination law efforts, the Trump Administration’s
efforts to roll back the Obama-era pay-data collection efforts center around cost.
As described previously, the sole justification given for suspending EEO-1
Component 2 data collection was cost.367 In 2016, the EEOC estimated a total
cost of approximately $53.5 million for 2017 and 2018 combined; the EEOC
under the Trump Administration recalculated to $1.23 billion ($614 million in
2017 and $622 million in 2018).368 This increase of twenty-three times the
original estimated cost is not only hard to rationalize but was generated only
after a federal district court found inadequate justification for staying the
order.369 Even using the Trump-era numbers arguendo, when divided by the
number of filers, this is an extremely manageable cost for a company to incur to
help play a role in redressing and preventing structural discrimination. The
original estimates were based on 60,886 firms (employers and contractors)370—
meaning a cost of $439 per firm per year. The revised estimates were based on
See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 16, at 396-99 (considering costs of disclosure).
See supra Part I.
365
SU, supra note 68, at 2.
366 Disclosure Update and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 10,532, Exchange
Act Release No. 83,875, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,203, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,148,
50,148 (Oct. 4, 2018).
367 See Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB Review,
Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1), 81 Fed.
Reg. 45,479, 45,484 (July 14, 2016).
368 EEO-1 Collection Information, supra note 230.
369 See Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d. 66, 90 (2019);
Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,493.
370 Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,494.
363
364
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90,000 firms filing371—meaning a cost of $6,869 per firm per year. For an
employer of 100 employees or more, even the revised number is a small amount
of money, particularly if it leads to improvement in productivity or a reduction
in litigation costs over the longer term.372
Given that any creation or expansion of equality disclosures would be limited
to specific information on pay, promotion, and harassment, there is little concern
of disclosure overload in this context. Instead, the real question is one of costs
and general employer concern about regulatory overload. There is no doubt that
imposing new disclosure requirements would add costs to business operations,
but there is a great deal of uncertainty about both how much cost and whether
the benefits would be worth it. In particular, as the example of the Component 2
pay-data collection shows, within seven months, nearly 90% of the at least
60,000 entities required to report373 were able to comply.374 Most importantly,
costs are only a problem if they are not worth the benefits. If we are truly
committed to rooting out discrimination and harassment, relative to other
options, this is a low cost to the government, and it places some cost on
employers to self-police. The law contemplates that employers must prevent and
redress discrimination. If that is true, this is a cost that should be imposed.

371 Agency Information Collection Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. 48,138,
48,141 (Sept. 12, 2019).
372 This radical change in calculation was, according to the Trump-era EEOC, because the
Obama-era EEOC calculated “at the individual employer level . . . and not at the individual
form level,” “relied . . . on the number of . . . ‘EEO–1 filers’ without considering the variation
in burden attributable to the different number and types of EEO–1 reports that different
employers file,” and failed to account for the fact that “an employer with numerous locations
[must] file a corresponding number of EEO-1 ‘establishment’ reports.” Id. at 48,140. The
Obama EEOC explained this choice with the explanation “that the bulk of the tasks performed
in completing the EEO–1 report will be completed at the firm level due to the centrality of
automation”—a rational assumption the Trump EEOC ignored. Id. (quoting Agency
Information Collection Activities: Notice of Submission for OMB Review, Final Comment
Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81 Fed Reg. at 45,493).
Regardless, it is difficult to believe that the $1.2 billion difference can be accounted for by
the Trump EEOC’s explanation: that it “has developed a more accurate methodology that
deconstructs the total number of reports submitted by report type and by filer type, and then
estimates an average burden based on the number and types of reports submitted.” Id. This
recalculation then led the Trump EEOC to conclude that “the utility of the data to its
enforcement programs” of “Component 2 is far outweighed by the burden imposed on
employers that must comply with the reporting obligation.” Id. at 48,141.
373 Compare Agency Information Collection Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 45,494 (estimating
in 2016 that “60,886 private industry and contractor filers” would “submit both Components
1 and 2 starting with the 2017 reporting cycle”), with Agency Information Collection
Activities: Existing Collection, 84 Fed. Reg. at 48,141 (“Because the number of Component
1 filers increased to 87,021 by the close of data year 2018, the EEOC is estimating that the
number of filers required to submit Component 1 will increase again to approximately 90,000
for data years 2019 through 2021.”).
374 See Lidgett, supra note 235.
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Manipulability and Symbolic Compliance

Separate from the issues of cost to employers is the risk that compelling
disclosures may not be effective because data produced by covered entities is
susceptible to manipulation. From the securities disclosure context, this is
another criticism: the concern that disclosure requirements will be made less
effective by “be[ing] so carefully calculated or cabined that they mislead by
omission” or include “half-truths.”375
In the context of antidiscrimination law, “symbolic compliance” has long
been a concern of scholars who study how the legal proscriptions get translated
into action in the workplace and how employer actions are then perceived as
legal compliance by courts.376 For example, Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev
have conducted extensive research to document how to separate employer
practices and policies on diversity management and harassment training that are
effective from those that are merely window dressing.377
While no self-policing mechanism is foolproof, there is reason to believe that
equality disclosure requirements that require specific types of data as proposed
can be designed in a way that limits their manipulation. All data disclosed under
this proposal would be verifiable as objective data—simply reporting what an
employee earns based on a W-2 statement, what their official job title is, and the
number of settlements. While the employer will be producing the data, the range
of information collected and the opportunities for manipulation of that
information will be limited. The EEOC can also provide definitional data to be
used, as it has done with EEO-1 and Component 2 data.378 Moreover, any data
submitted to the EEOC and/or made public by the employer could be
investigated or audited by the EEOC for compliance, creating an incentive for
the employer to limit any manipulation it might contemplate. As proposed, pay,
promotion, and settlement data is concrete and specific and would be submitted
to the EEOC, leaving little room for interpretation—unlike an assessment of

Sale, supra note 65, at 1052.
See generally, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009); LAUREN
B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS (2016).
377 See generally, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training
Work?: The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2018, at
48 [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?]; Frank Dobbin &
Alexandra Kalev, The Promise and Peril of Sexual Harassment Programs, 116 PNAS 12,255
(2019); Elizabeth C. Tippett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 481 (2018).
378 See EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205 (categorizing employment data
concerning sex, race, and ethnicity using ten defined occupational categories).
375
376
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whether something is “material” before it must be disclosed such as in the
securities context379 or creating a merely symbolic training.380
3.

Rebound Effects

A final criticism of disclosure requirements is that the requirement to disclose
certain information may result in unintended negative consequences that
actually undermine intended outcomes. Here, the main concern would be related
to harassment or discrimination settlement reporting; pay- and promotion-data
reporting would not likely lead to any backlash, as only increasing pay or
seniority of women or racial minorities could improve employer data. Hemel
and Lund considered these “backfire” effects in their proposal to add sexual
harassment reporting to SEC disclosures, raising “the risk that companies will
respond by implementing measures designed to keep allegations from coming
to their attention” or that, even though disclosures “are required to keep the
victim’s name confidential . . . , the prospect of public disclosure could chill
employee reporting.”381 Unintended consequences could arguably be more
damaging in the context of equality disclosures to the EEOC. Because employers
are both the subjects of complaints and the reporters of information that can
subject them to liability or investigation to the entity that would investigate—
the EEOC, not the SEC—they may try to discourage discrimination or
harassment complaints.
Yet two things mitigate this concern. First, in the context of hostile work
environment claims, since 1998, under Supreme Court decisions in Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton382 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,383 Title VII
provides an affirmative defense from liability where a supervisor’s harassment
does not result in a tangible employment action, “the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior,” and “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”384 This is a strong defense that has greatly increased

See SU, supra note 68, at 1.
See Dobbin & Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?, supra note 377, at 48-49
(describing how corporations may find training essential despite ineffectiveness because such
trainings are “vital for fending off lawsuits”).
381 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1666-67 (concluding, however, that doing so
“could render them vulnerable to a . . . claim” against directors for breach of duty of loyalty).
They also discuss the risk of the “Mike Pence” effect—that “male employers will respond in
ways that redound to the detriment of female employees”—but properly conclude that “[t]he
argument that we should refrain from penalizing executives for behaving illegally because
they might respond by behaving illegally is . . . a weak one.” Id. at 1674-75. I agree.
382 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
383 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
384 Id. at 765.
379
380

2021]

DISCLOSING DISCRIMINATION

353

employers’ creation and encouragement of employee reporting, even though it
has been subject to criticism for shielding employers from liability.385
Second, these risks arise only when the employee reports internally and never
to the EEOC, which an employee must also do to pursue any claim or lawsuit
under Title VII.386 The employer cannot stop an employee from complaining to
the EEOC, so the charge would be recorded regardless; there is no additional
benefit in deterring an employee from pursuing a claim that is arbitrated or
settled to hide its existence from the EEOC once the EEOC knows about the
charge. If the employee felt deterred from complaining internally, they could
still complain only to the EEOC and argue that their failure to report internally
was not unreasonable given employer pressure, thus limiting the employer’s
Faragher/Ellerth defense. And employees need not report any claim of
discrimination other than harassment internally.
As for the chilling effect of fear that confidential reporting would be made
public, in reality, the far greater deterrent to any employee is fear of retaliation
at work. If they can get past that fear, repeated assurances that the accuser’s
identifying data would be kept confidential may suffice. Nevertheless, the
interaction of disclosure requirements with internal reporting systems poses a
potential concern that the EEOC will need to track.387
B.

Privacy Concerns

Because this Article is proposing that, to the extent possible, disclosure
information should be reported publicly, critics may also raise concerns about
infringing on the privacy of employers and possibly their employees.388

385 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Potter, Note, When Women’s Silence Is Reasonable: Reforming
the Faragher/Ellerth Defense in the #MeToo Era, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 603, 605 (2020)
(criticizing how courts have interpreted the defense because it “allows employers to easily
escape liability in cases where victims have been silent”).
386 See supra Section I.A (describing how Title VII requires administrative exhaustion).
387 See Hemel & Lund, supra note 19, at 1675 (“This is not to dismiss the backfire concern
out of hand; it is to say that the benefits of increased legal protection almost certainly outweigh
the costs.”).
388 A separate issue that may arise around collection of the data by employers is the
concern of employee privacy in having to identify gender or race. Given that the EEOC
already collects EEO-1 data, existing procedures should govern. The United Kingdom
considered and issued best practices for how to handle nonbinary gender classification. See
ADVISORY, CONCILIATION & ARB. SERV., MANAGING GENDER PAY REPORTING 9 (2019),
https://archive.acas.org.uk/media/4764/Managing-gender-pay-reporting/pdf/Managing
_gender_pay_reporting_07.02.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/448E-D8V2] (“It is important for
employers to be sensitive to how an employee chooses to self-identify in terms of their gender.
The regulations do not define the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ and the requirement to report
gender pay should not result in employees being singled out and questioned about their
gender. . . . [M]ost employers should be able to base reports on the gender identification the
employee has provided for HR . . . . [E]mployers should establish a method which enables all
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Requiring employers to provide anonymized demographic and salary
information on employees to the EEOC falls well short of raising any Fourth
Amendment concerns around search and seizure.389 But, as described
previously, under Title VII and the EEOC’s current EEO-1-data-collection
program, the government is required to keep collected data confidential.390
Given existing practices, employers are likely to resist greater collection and
exposure of data on equality measures, fearing negative repercussions of
unflattering data. One option that could alleviate employers’ privacy concerns is
to expand EEO-1 data collection to provide the additional Component 2 pay
data, data on leadership, and data on harassment settlements only to the EEOC
in the same confidential manner as currently exists. Even this may be met with
resistance by some employers. Jamillah Bowman Williams has documented the
recent trend of technology companies seeking exemptions to FOIA requests for
existing EEO-1 data by claiming that workforce diversity matters are protected
trade secrets.391 Yet no court has held that raw data on workforce demographics
should be subject to such protections (as opposed to companies’ “strategies” or
“initiatives” around improving diversity).392 Thus, expanding EEO-1 data
collection under existing confidentiality practices should pose no new privacy
problem for employers.
A more useful disclosure regime, however, would include some publication—
whether aggregated or identified only by industry, or, even more effective,
employer identified like the European model.393 Should more employeremployees to confirm or update their gender. . . . In cases where the employee does not selfidentify as either gender, an employer may omit the individual from the calculations.”).
389 There is neither a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information by the employee
nor an unreasonable search or intrusion by the government requesting it from the employer.
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
390 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-8(e); EEO-1 Instruction Booklet, supra note 205. Following the
EEOC and Title VII model, state laws or proposals to collect pay data in New York and
California and the collection of sexual-harassment-settlement data in Maryland and Illinois
all also require and ensure confidentiality of reported data to the state fair employment
practices agency only. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-108 (2020); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-715 (West 2020); S.B. 171, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); S.B. S4065,
2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
391 See Williams, supra note 17, at 1693-96.
392 See id. at 1707 (explaining how trade secret caselaw “suggests that diversity strategies
and data may deserve differing treatment”); see also Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 16,
at 391-94 (considering employers’ arguments that disclosures contain “proprietary
information”); Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 792-93 (same with regard to
pay-data disclosures).
393 As discussed, this would require a change to Title VII. See supra notes 252-59 and
accompanying text.
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identifying information be made public, on some level, the response to
concerned employers should be “too bad.” When compared to data collection in
Europe, or even in the United States as required by the SEC, the mandate to the
EEOC to protect the privacy of employers seems both unnecessary and
misguided. Congress passed Title VII, employers are mandated to comply, and
improvement in workplace equality is still stalled. If employers are hesitant to
share their information publicly, that is the point—that is the power of improving
compliance through disclosure. Ironically, the European disclosure laws rely on
the power of publicity, despite the fact that the EU has much stronger data
privacy protections than the United States.394 Title VII enforcement has long
been hampered by a strong jurisprudential deference to employers.395 It is worth
questioning why the EEOC continues to keep compliance data confidential
when discrimination persists six decades after Title VII was enacted.
On the employee side, the EEOC could and should continue to ensure that
individual identifying information about employees is protected.396 If employer
data were published, it would be in the aggregate, with no employee names
attached. Moreover, all covered entities would have at least 100 employees, so
it is unlikely that the data would be granular enough to impact the privacy of any
individual employee. If employee privacy still remained a concern, the EEOC
could publish analyses of pay- and promotion-gap data only, as in the U.K.
model, rather than publishing raw data by salary bands. While employee privacy
concerns should not be taken lightly, an equality-disclosure-reporting regime as
envisioned in this Article would not risk exposure of any individual employee
information.
C.

First Amendment Concerns

Lastly, because an equality-disclosure requirement would compel private
businesses to produce information to a governmental agency, critics may argue
that it constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Lower
courts have considered related issues, but whether compelling public disclosures
could violate the free speech rights of employer entities has yet to be directly

394 See Editorial Board, Opinion, Where Is America’s Privacy Law?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2019, at SR10 (describing the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation,
which “establishes several privacy rights that do not exist in the United States”); EUR.
PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POL’YS, A COMPARISON BETWEEN US
AND EU DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 67 (2015),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536459/IPOL_STU(2015)536
459_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/46YF-X7ZT].
395 See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 166, at 888 (documenting judicial deference to
“formal organizational policies prohibiting discrimination or guaranteeing fair treatment” as
evidence of nondiscrimination).
396 See Estlund, Extending the Case, supra note 16, at 797-98 (considering employee
privacy concerns raised by pay-data disclosures).
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addressed by the Supreme Court.397 A complete analysis of this topic, on which
there is a robust and significant body of scholarship,398 is well beyond the scope
of this Article. Yet the few commentators to consider the issue in the context of
antidiscrimination law provide some guidance.399
Broadly speaking, only certain types of speech are protected against
government interference by the First Amendment. Regulation of unprotected
speech must be reasonable to serve a governmental interest under rational basis
review; regulation of protected speech, however, must be narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial government interest under strict scrutiny.400 Helen Norton
suggests that information-forcing mechanisms like pay transparency rules
intended to support enforcement of antidiscrimination law should fall outside
the First Amendment as unprotected “commercial speech.”401 Where the Court
has extended First Amendment protection to some commercial speech, it has
done so to protect consumers; because “the Court has applied only deferential
review to laws requiring commercial speakers to make accurate disclosures to
their listeners,” she suggests, “antidiscrimination laws . . . that require truthful
disclosures by commercial actors will generally survive this review.”402 Even if
such disclosures were considered protected speech, Norton argues, they should
survive strict scrutiny: truthful disclosures on employment rights and conditions
“provide considerable value to workers as listeners while imposing little, if any,
expressive costs” on employers.403 Moreover, enforcing antidiscrimination law
Aronson, supra note 19, at 1212.
See generally, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing:
Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487 (2016); Aronson, supra note 19;
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277 (2014); Charlotte
Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323
(2016); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Helen Norton, Discrimination, the
Speech that Enables It, and the First Amendment, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 209 (2020)
[hereinafter Norton, Discrimination]; Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace:
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016) [hereinafter Norton,
Truth and Lies in the Workplace]; Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA.
L. REV. 867 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133; Cass R.
Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 653 (1993).
399 See generally, e.g., Aronson, supra note 19; Norton, Discrimination, supra note 398.
400 Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980), with Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985); see
also Post, supra note 402, at 881-900 (comparing the two cases).
401 Norton, Discrimination, supra note 398, at 234-38, 245-46, 248-51.
402 Id. at 249-51; see also Post, supra note 402, at 901-907 (discussing caselaw supporting
the proposition that “government may require the disclosure only of purely factual and
‘uncontroversial’ information” and “that close constitutional scrutiny will apply to
government efforts to compel entities to disseminate ideas or opinions [rather than facts], even
within the medium of commercial speech”).
403 Norton, Discrimination, supra note 398, at 250.
397
398
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and eliminating protected class discrimination has long been held to be a
compelling government interest.404
In the context of sexual harassment complaints, Elizabeth Aronson
acknowledges that compelled disclosures may not fit well within current
understandings of “commercial speech” but argues that they still do not
necessarily implicate any heightened level of scrutiny.405 Regardless of whether
compelled disclosures qualify as commercial or noncommercial speech,
Aronson suggests, they provide more information to the public and thus further
First Amendment interests.406 That said, Aronson notes that courts could
“consider . . . explicitly adopting a regulatory exception for such disclosures” to
best serve First Amendment values and create clarity in the law.407
Perhaps the strongest response to concerns about equality disclosures
infringing on employer speech is that the EEOC has been successfully collecting
EEO-1 data without challenge or great disruption to employer speech interests
since just after Title VII’s enactment. Of course, this does prevent such a
challenge in the future, particularly if the EEOC requires additional data on pay,
promotion, or harassment settlements. Yet under existing doctrine, any rule
merely expanding factual information collected from employers could likely be
drafted without implicating the First Amendment.408
CONCLUSION
Since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the U.S. government has
relied on workers to recognize, raise, and pursue claims of discrimination and
harassment, despite the serious risk of retaliation for doing so. In passing Title
VII, Congress created the EEOC to help investigate and litigate such claims, but
the bulk of its limited resources are spent processing charges and giving
employees permission to hire private lawyers to litigate claims themselves. Due
to resource constraints, the EEOC pursues only a small fraction of litigation each
year relative to the number of private employee suits. The law prohibits
retaliation for complaining of discrimination, but that does not stop employers
from retaliating; the only redress an employee has for retaliation is to add a
retaliation claim to the discrimination claim they are already pursuing.
Relying so heavily on private employee suits leads to underreporting of
discrimination and harassment and to underenforcement even if complaints are
reported. While this has long been a problem with the enforcement mechanism
of Title VII, the most recent decade of Supreme Court precedent on mandatory
arbitration and class action certification stands to worsen the situation by forcing
David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV.
83, 84-86 (2001).
405 Aronson, supra note 19, at 1233.
406 Id.
407 Id.
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employees out of the courts and into private arbitration, where they may be
barred from pursuing any claim on a class-wide basis. This means that, not only
is it difficult to hold employers accountable for discriminatory treatment, but
when employees are willing to take the risk to raise and pursue them, their claims
are isolated and hidden away in secret proceedings. This perfect storm of
underreporting, underenforcement, and the invisibility of enforcement means
that an employer who violates the law may carry on as they always have with
impunity, while systemic recurring problems of harassment and discrimination
remain unaddressed.
This need not and should not be the case. Even without radically increasing
the resources and capacity of the EEOC for public enforcement, the EEOC can
place additional regulatory requirements on employers to produce information
that can document the scope of the problem, assist existing enforcement efforts,
and motivate employers to reduce inequality by self-policing. Looking to
examples of disclosure requirements in securities law and to models for equality
measures in other countries’ and some U.S. state law provides a path forward.
As proposed, a disclosure regime in which employers are compelled to
publicly produce basic information on pay, promotion, and harassment
settlements by race and gender is a reasonable and necessary way to fulfill the
promise of Title VII. Employers can and should be required to track and redress
inequality and harassment fostered in their own institutions—without an
employee having to risk personal peril by bringing a lawsuit to make them do
so.

